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ABSTRACT
Trends in offshore fatal ities and lost time accidents since
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 need to be
identified to al Iowan evaluation of the safety of offshore operations.
Fatal ity and accident data between 1975 and 1985 are analyzed in the
context of the Federal regulatory structure.

The safety data generated

for oil and gas drilling operations on the Outer Continental She1f
varies according to the source of the information.

Modifications to

accident reporting formats and data collection systems would benefit
the offshore industry and the Government regulators in their efforts to
improve operational safety.

A major regulatory mechanism created to

ensure that the best avai lable and safest technologies are employed
during Outer Continental Shelf dri I I ing operations has not resulted in
deepwater operations achieving a safety record as good as other offshore areas.

The mandated economic considerations of this 'Iegislation

appear to have al lowed the letter of the law to be achieved without
providing a commensurate improvement in offshore safety.

II
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBlEM
Federal safety regulations promulgated to protect personnel
and equipment during oi I and gas dri I ling operations on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OeS) do not address specific conditions associated
with the evol'ution of emerging offshore technologies.

The oes Lands

Act Amendments of 1978 established an equipment-oriented regulatory
program. 1 It requires that the best available and safest technologies
(BAST) be applied to oes operations.

The Amendments left primary

responsibi lity for ensuring the safety of offshore operations to the
oil and gas industry.

A Federal safety policy that vests such respon-

sibi lity with companies operating on the oes appears to be desirable
from an administratilve standpoint.

However, serious questions remain

unanswered about the performance and accountabi lity of the industry,
especially in the face of excess supply of and lower prices for crude
oi I.

A significant question to ask prior to addressing the pol icy

issue is what trends in oes operational safety can be identified in
recent years?
Operational safety, for purposes of this analysis, is defined
as the protection of life and limb during al I phases of oes dri I ling
activities.

Included are moving to and from the location and the

physical act of drilling.

The protection of life and limb will be

examined over time by quantifying fatalities and accidents.

The trends

in safety issues that emerged between 1975 and 1985 wi I I be analyzed.
The role of the Federal government in regulating oes activities wi I I

1

also be examined In terms of statutory intent and pol icy implementation.

SCOPE AND lIMITATIONS
The

oes

Lands Act of 1953 provided for the jurisdiction of the

Federal government over the submerged lands of the
state boundaries.

oes,

seaward of the

The Act also authorized the Secretary of the

Interior to lease such lands for certain purposes, including mineral
exploration and development. 2
The 1978 Amendments to the Act resulted from an attempt to
resolve conflicts primarily associated with the Federal leasing program
and its role in assuring the contribution of
domestic supplies.

The resulting

oes

oes

energy resources to

regulatory program was responsI-

ble for managing the nation's offshore mineral resources in a manner
that best benefited the country in terms of addressing the promise and
risk of developing

oes

resources.

Under authority of the DeS Lands Act there are seven Federal
agencies in four different departments that have regulatory authority
over DeS dril ling operations.

The Department of Interior (Dol) and the

Department of Transportation (DoT) are the two departments most
involved in the rulemaking and enforcement of safety considerations
from the standpoint of design, construction, installation, and operation of DeS faci lities.

Therefore, the previously stated problem wi I I

primari Iy be examined in terms of the applicable regulatory arms of the
Dol and DoT.

These are the Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the

United States Coast Guard (USCG), respectively.

The scope and I imita-

tions of the problem are generally contained within Sections 21 and 22
of the 1978 DeS Lands Act Amendments. 3
2

Offshore oi I and gas

e~ploration

and development takes place

in areas under the jurisdictions of both Federal and state governments.
The Federal government has exclusive jurisdiction at least 200 nautical
miles seaward of the baselines used to calculate the coastal
landward boundaries.

states~

States have jurisdiction for leasing mineral

rights over the area 3 geographic miles from the established baselines.
Exceptions to this are in the Gulf of Mexico, where Texas and Fforida
each claim a distance of 3 marine leagues.

Much of the current explo-

ration and development dri I I ing activity occurs within Federal
jurisdiction.
Government regulation of marine safety, in particular that
related to offshore drill ing operations, is part of a broad mandate to
explore and develop offshore resources.

Marine safety legislation in

this context refers to statutes, regulations, orders, standards, or
criteria, which demand compliance during offshore dri I I ing operations.
The principal objective of marine safety regulation is to protect lives
and property.4
The actual implementation of the Federal

government~s

Des

safety regulations involves the promulgation of regulations by the
various agencies at the national level with occasional interpretative
guidance at the regional levels to establ ish rules, procedures, and
standards for DeS development.

The implementation of regulations is

affected by the technical capabilities of the government personnel
administering them.

The numerous agencies involved with dupl icative

and overlapping authorities and regulations have been criticized by the
offshore industry for the confusion and cost burdens they create.

3

Recognizing the overlapping jurisd,ictions, the agencies have
made use of negotiated Memorandums of Understanding (MDUs) to resolve
confl icts, to enhance safety, and improve efficiency.

The 1980 MDU

between the MMS and the USeG recognizes the expertise of the MMS in
regulating offshore dri I I ing and production activities and the tradition and experience of the USeG in regulating maritime safety.S

For

example, the USeG has responsibility for a mobile offshore dri I ling
unit (MDDU) as a vessel, whi Ie the MMS has responsibi I ity for dri I ling
operations undertaken from the MDDU.

The MMS and the USeG have also

entered into interagency agreements with the other Federal agencies to
administer various workplace safety regulations. 6
No unified regutations governing workplace safety on the DeS
presently exist.

However, in 1986 MMS published proposed revisions to
Dol offshore operating rules in the Federal Register. 7 Included in the
proposed changes were the consolidation of several' separate regulatory
requirements ,into a single document.
rulemaking

w~1

Speciftc detai Is of the proposed

I be examined later in this study.

The USCG is also

preparing a set of regulations under the authority of the DeS Lands
Act, as amended, to address offshore workplace safety problems. 8

The

USCG regulatory authority applies to the safety ofl ife and property
governing offshore operations and makes frequent reference to industry
standards and recommended practices.

The history of offshore oi I and

gas operations fol lows safety and technological improvements initiated
by the commercial sector, and their standards and recommended practices
have often been incorporated into regulations. 9
The 1978 DeS Lands Act Amendments also establ ished a potential
10
focusing mechanism for the Federal DeS safety regulatory program.

4

Section 21(b) of the Amendments cal led for the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and the Secretary of the Department i,n which the
Coast Guard is operating (currently the DoT), to require on al I new
drilling and production operations and wherever practical on existing
operations, the use of the best available and safest technologies
wherever failure of equipment would have a significant effect on
safety, health, or the environment.
economically feasible.

The equipment must be determined

Exceptions are made where the incremental bene-

fits are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of
utilizing the technologies. 11 The BAST requirement has the potential
capacity to better ensure the adequacy of regulations that provide for
OCS safety.

The intent is to standardize certain pieces of operational

equipment in order to reduce the number of accidents that occur as a
result of equipment fai lure or the lack of fami I iarity of personnel
with the equipment due to the large number of alternative technologies
in use.

The legislative history of the BAST requirement wi I I be

exam i ned and the conceptual issues lead i ng to its cod i f icat i on wi I I be)
discussed.

In addition, the question of how successfully the Federal

government has regulated innovative offshore technologies since 1978
wi I I be addressed in this study.

The MMS is presently implementing a

BAST program on agency, national, and regional levels while the USCG is
sti I I in the process of developing its BAST program.
Section 21(b) of the 1978 Amendments also defined the scope of
what faci lities are to be regulated by referring to Section 4(8)1 of
the OCS Lands Act which extended Federal jurisdiction to include artificial islands and al I instal lations and other devices permanently or
12
temporarily attached to the seabed.

5

Section 22(a) states that MMS and USCG have enforcement
authority over safety regulations. 13 The Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) rules wi II be considered only as supplementary because most of them are not offshorespecific.
Hypotheses
Two hypotheses wi I I be tested in this analysis:
1.

Historical trends in oes operational safety
indicate that the requirements of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978
have improved the safety of offshore operations.

2.

Implementation of the best avai lable and safest
technologies requirement has not resulted in
deepwater dri I ling operations achieving improvements in safety that are as good as other offshore areas.

Methodology
The fol lowing assumptions were made in establ ishing a methodology to test the hypotheses:

(1) The exploratory dri I I ing phase of

OCS operations accounts for a disproportional Iy large share of safety
concerns in offshore operations; (2) the current status of domestic OCS
activities in deepwater and other frontier areas is largely in the
exploration stage; (3) because of competition, it is difficult for a
regulatory body to maintain a staff with sufficient technical knowledge
of oes facilities and operations to adequately assess equipment-

6

(

oriented safety issues; and (4) declining crude oi I prices and cor porate mergers generally tend to have a negative effect on exploration
budgets and Increases the uncertainty of the Industry's ability to
maintain an adequate level of safety through worker motivation and
training.

011 spills and their associated impacts to the environment

will be not be included in this research.

The analysis that fol lows

the presentation of the accident data wi II examine the problems faced
by the industry that develops the various exploratory technology and
the regulators involved in the determination of BAST.
In addition to the OCS Lands Act, as Amended, the Section
21(a) Report mandated by the Amendments and the National Research
Council (NRC) Marine Board's study, "Safety and Offshore Oi I," are
central to this analysis. 14 The NRC study was originally requested by
the Dol, U.S. Geological Survey Conservation Division, in order to
determine specific topics to be addressed in the Section 21(a) Report.
However, "Safety and Offshore Oi I" was such a comprehensive effort that
the Section 21(a) Report was simply a series of responses to several of
the many recommendations offered by the Marine Board.

The NRC report

determined that the OCS regulatory system is not designed to take the
best advantage of the entire industrial management structure to motivate concern for safety on every level.

As currently constituted, the

Federal program is generally comprised of regulations that are based on
the premise that if the law commands, operators wi I I obey and that
inspection wi I I therefore ensure compl iance.

The report included a

recommendation that Federal agencies incorporate alternative techniques
into the regulatory system to better uti I ize the potential of the
15
industrial management structure in promoting safe worker performance.

7

The 1981 NRC report also indicated that regulations do not
comprehensively address the subject of worker training and qual ification with regard to workplace safety.

Regulations have been much more

successful in applying new technologies rather than in ensuring that
workers, particularly those at the entry-level, are properly trained in
safe practices.

This lack of property trained workers was found to be

a common weakness throughout the offshore industry.

The NRC study

concluded that workplace safety on the OCS is not easi Iy improved by
legislation or detailed regulations.

It found that during dri II ing

operations, workers with less than a year on the job account for more
than 75 percent of lost time accidents, and that more than half of
these injuries occur within the first 6 months of employment. 16
The final sentence of Section 21(a) of the 1978 Amendments
directs the President, in light of the findings in the above mentioned
reports, to submit a plan to Congress with his proposa.s to formulate a
Federal safety poi icy for mineral resource extraction operations on the
OCS. 17 Some of the responses to recommendations contained in the Section 21(a) Report are now being implemented through the regulatory
process. 18 However, this research does not lend itself to a determination of the adequacy of an emerging, but sti, II ambiguous Federal safety
poi icy.

A significant issue to be considered is whether recent trends

in accident frequencies point to successes or fai lures in regulatory
efforts to increase offshore safety.
The 1984 NRC Marine Board Study, "Safety Information and
Management of

th~

OCS," and the 1985 Office of Technology Assessment

Study, "Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater," which
examine concerns resulting from the rapid advances recently made in

8

frontier technologies on the

DeS and their associated interaction with

safety regulations wi II also be used as references In this analysis.

19

Determining the applicability of existing safety regulations to the
innovative technologies being developed in previously unexplored areas
is a timely topic.

Assessing the adequacy of the procedures that

Federal regulators employ to decide which technologies are considered
BAST is a subject worthy of continued study.
OCS operational safety data gathered from the International
Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), for the period of 1975
through 1985, will be analyzed. 20 Lost time accidents (LTA) and fatalities will be presented as

freq~ency

rates.

The data wi I I be normal-

ized per man hour in order to indicate the relative level of offshore
activity that occurred during the period of record.

Also avai lable are

data from the MMS Safety Information Program events file and the Coast
Guard Marine Safety Office accident reporting system. 21 These programs
i

contain some equipment-specific data that wi 1I al low for a discussion
of some of the casual factors that contributed to the trends in OCS
safety during the past 10 years.
Once the first hypothesis concerning safety trends has been
addressed, the second hypothesis wi I I be discussed to determine cause
and effect relationships of the BAST requirement.

The implementation

of BAST wi II be assessed by using deepwater Gulf of Mexico data as a
surrogate for the "innovative technology" that would have required BAST
development.

A discussion of current safety regulations and their

legislative history wi I I be included in Chapter 2.
~iterature

will also be considered in this chapter.

9

The pertinent
Presentation and

analysis of DeS operational safety data wi I I be addressed in the following chapter beginning with the lADC accident statistics.

Data

collected through the MMS regulatory regime and under authority of the
USCG wi I I also be included in Chapter 3, along with oi I price
information.

A final chapter wi I I evaluate recent trends in offshore

safety and discuss the relationship between Federal OCS safety pol icy
and accident rates.

The DCS safety issue wi I I also be examined in the

broader context of the long-standing policy question of how government
can best manage ocean issues.

A discussion of the basic rotary dri I l-

ing concept used on the OCS is provided in Appendix I to aid the reader
in understanding some of the technologies needed to dri I I offshore
wei Is.

A description of how some of the frequently occurring accidents

typica'lly happen is also included.
Notes

1.

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, U.S. Code,
Title 43, Sections 1801 et. seq.

2.

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, U.S. Code, Title 43, Sections
1331 et. seq.

3.

43 U.S.C. 1347-1348, Sections 21 and 22 refer to the language
contained in Public Law 95-372 (92 STAT.654-657) , September 18,
1978.

4.

Federal statutory legislation is vested in Title 33 of the United
States Code of Federal Regulations (Navigation and Navigable
Waters) and Title 46 (Shipping).

These set out the original

regulations that applied to offshore activities.

In addition, the

1953 OCS Lands Act and the 1978 Amendments provided a mechanism

10

for the Dol and the DoT to promulgate and enforce additional regulations related to offshore dri I ling activtties.

These are

establ ished in Title 30 (Operations) as wei I as Title 43 (Rulemaking) and additions to Title 46.
As many as 18 Federal agencies have an active interest in regulating some aspects of OCS operations in the United States.

Of the

seven agencies that have statutory authority to regulate dri I ling
activities on the OCS, the two principal departments that administer the majority of offshore safety legislation are, as previously mentioned, Dol and DoT.

The departments and their

agencies are as fol lows:
•

Department of the Interior (Dol)
Bureau of land Management (BlM)

•

-

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)

-

Minerals Management Service (MMS)

Department of Transportation (DoT)
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

•

Department of labor (Dol)
Occupational Safety and Hea'th Administration (OSHA)

•

Department of Defense (000)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

5.

K.V. Feeney, "The Coast

Guard~s

Offshore Safety Program," paper

prepared for distribution at the Offshore Technology Conference,
Houston, TX, 1985, p. 7 (typewritten).
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6. These agreements include those dealing with FAA hel iport requirements and certain OSHA rules that are not offshore-specific;
therefore are not within the scope of this research.
7.

U.S. Department of the Interior/Minerals Management Service, "Oi I
and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS)," Federal Register 51, No. 52, March 18, 1986, 9316-9425.

8.

43 U.S.C. 1347-1348.

9.

Traditionally, organizations such as the American Bureau of Shipping, the American Petroleum Institute, and the American National
Standards Institute/American Society of Mechanical Engineers have
publ ished specifications that are adopted as OCS Orders.

For

example, Gulf of Mexico OCS Order No.5, Production Safety
Systems, Section 3.2, states, in part, that " ... subsurfacecontrol led subsurface safety values ... shal I conform to American
Petroleum Institute (API) Specifications for Subsurface-Safety
Values API Spec. 14A, Fourth Edition, November 1979 ... ".

From:

United States Department of the Interior/Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf Orders Governing Oi I
and Gas Lease Operations, January, 1980, p. 5-3.
10.

43 U.S.C. 1347 (b).

11.

Ibid.

12.

Section 21(b) of the OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Publ ic Law
95-372 (92 STAT. 655) , as codified in 43 U.S.C. 1347(b).

13.

Section 22(a) of the OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Publ i,c Law
95-372 (92 STAT.655), as codified in 43 U.S.C. 1348(a).

14.

43 U.S.C. 1331-1356, The Section 21(a) Report was the result of
the "Study" mandated by 43 U.S.C. 1347(a) , entitled "Joi,nt Report

12

by United States Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service on
DCS Safety and Health Regulations and Technology Pursuant to
Requirements in Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978,· Reston, VA, 1983 (typewritten), hereafter referred to as
the Section 21(a) Report in the text; Safety and Offshore Oi I,
Report of the Committee on Assessment of Safety of Outer Continental Shelf Activities, Marine Board Assembly of Engineering,
National Research Counci I, by George F. Meehl in, Chairman
(Washington, DC:

National Academy Press, 1981).

15.

National Research Counci I, Safety and Offshore Oi I, pp. 243-244.

16.

Ibid.

17.

43 U.S.C. 1347(a).

18.

For example, the Coast Guard revised the casualty reporting
requirements of 33 CFR 146 and various parts of 46 CFR in response
to a recommendation that the collection of workplace data be
strengthened.

The Marine Board recommendation and response to it

are found in the ·Section 21(a) Report,· pp. 26-28.
19.

Safety Information and Management on the Outer Continental Shelf,
Report of the Committee on Outer Continental Shelf Safety Information and Analysis, Marine Board Commission on Engineering and
Technical Systems, National Research Counci I, by Hyla S.
Napadensky, Chairman (Washington, DC:

National Academy Press,

1984); Oil and Gas Technologies for the Arctic and Deepwater
(Washington, DC:

United States Congress, Office of Technology

Assessment Report OTA-O-270, 1985).
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20.

The basic data were obtained by mai I from the International
Association of Dri I ling Contractors in Houston, Texas.

The infor-

mation was avai lable in annual Accident Safety Statistics Reports
consisting of a series of exhibits that classified injuries,
fatalities, and related data.
more detailed over time.
data.

The presentations generally became

The use of graphs began with the 1984

However, the data used in this analysis was collected and

presented in a consistent manner throughout the period of study.
21.

The data from the MMS events file were obtained in person at the
United States Geological Survey National Headquarters Bui Iding in
Reston, Virginia.

The information was made avai lable via a

special request for a computer run to the Minerals Management
Service, Division of Offshore Operations.

The totals were

manually verified by telephone to ensure that a thorough data run
had been completed; the Coast Guard data were obtained by mai I
from the Marine Investigation Division, Washington, OC.

The

information was provided following a written request to the Chief
of the Marine Safety Evaluation Branch.
The data obtained from both agencies is considered to be the most
accurate publical Iy avai lable safety information.

However, both

data fi les have simi lar weaknesses that will become apparent
Chapter 3.

In

The deficiencies are due to fundamental changes in

reporting systems and data collection formats.

Some were simply

technological advances and others were due to regulatory change.
The result is that historical analysis is difficult and the value
of the agency data bases are limited.
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Chapter 2

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
REGll..ATORY STRUCME
The oi I industry had been moving offshore for nearly half a
century when the 1945 Truman Proclamation arrested further development
at the state level by asserting that the Government of the United
States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the
Continental Shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to its coasts as
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control.

Truman made mention in the first paragraph of the proclama-

tion that the United States is aware of the long range world-wide need
for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, and holds the vIew
that efforts to discover and make available new suppllies of these
resources should be encouraged. 1
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 effectively reversed a decislon of the U.S. Supreme Court by granting the states title to and
ownership of the lands beneath the navigable waters seaward of their
coastlines to a distance of three geographical m.iles, with the additional opportunity to prove title out to three marine leagues (approximately 10.35 statute mi les) into the Gulf of Mexico. 2 Florida and
Texas have taken advantage of this provision, whereas all other

coasta~

states and the Atlantic coast of Florida have their seaward boundaries
set at the three geographical mi Ie line.

The Act al lowed for continu-

ance of oil industry development on state-leased lands that petroleum
was being produced from on or before December 11, 1950, and established
other provisions for lease terms that were executed by states and which
were in force and effect on June 5, 1950.
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The Act also retained

Federal powers regarding navigation, commerce, and national defense, as
well as preserving Federal ownership and control of the submerged lands
lying seaward of the belt granted the coastal states. 3
The 1953 OCS Lands Act reaffirmed that those lands beyond the
three geographical mi Ie limit appertain to and are subject to the
jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition of the Federal Government, and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant mineral
leases on OCS lands and to prescribe such regulations as might be
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 4
Thus, the Act
designated the 001 to administer the mineral leasing of the offshore
areas of the United States under Federal jurisdiction.
Unti I January of 1982, the Department had delegated responsibi I ity for the regulation of al I OCS oi I and gas operations to the USGS
Conservation Division.

The USGS issued regulations for oi I and gas

operations on a national or regional basis, as appropriate.

The regu-

lations emphasized the safety of operations, the protection of life and
property, and the prevention of pollution.
Former 001 Secretary James Watt established the MMS on January
19, 1982, with Secretarial Order (SO) 307-1. 5 The creation of MMS
represented an effort by 001 to increase financial efficiency through
better royalty management practices and was created in response to
recommendations of the "Commission on Fiscal Accountabi I ity of the
Nation's Energy Resources."6

The action initially consisted of the

consol idation of the Conservation Division of the USGS, the Offshore
Leasing Management Agency of BLM, and a portion of the Office of OCS
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Pol icy Coordination (POeS).

Amendments 1 and 2 to sa 307-1 consol i-

dated the remainder of poes, as wei I as giving all oes leasing activities to MMS and establishing the necessary administrative functions and
procedures to run the offshore program. 7 The procedures and responsibi lities of MMS regarding offshore safety regulations remain essential'ly the same as those under the USGS Conservation Division.

For

purposes of clarity and consistency, the acronym MMS wi I I be used when
discussing DOl regulatory functions since the 1953 OCS Lands Act,
although prior to 1982 the actual responsibi I ity lay with the USGS.
MMS is responsible for issuing and updating OCS Orders under
30 CFR parts and 250 and 256. 8 The orders are issued by the Director
of MMS to implement the requirements of the regulations and have the
force of law, therefore operators must comply with them just as they
must comply with the Regulations.

Because of the detai led nature and

comprehensive scope of the Orders, the potential for noncompliance is
high.

Enforcement is the responsibi lity of MMS District Supervisors.

Therefore, the districts also issue Notices to Lessees (NTL).

An NTL

is usually a regional notification that clarifies or interprets a regulation, order, or lease sale stipulation.

OCS operators are required

to conduct inspections and tests of equipment and faci I ities at specified intervals and certify that the inspections were carried out and
appropriate corrective measures taken.

Unannounced compl iance inspec-

tions by MMS personnel, in addition to the operator)s inspections, are
conducted twice a year.

MMS employs full-time inspectors who are

special ists in dri I ling or production operations.

Checkl ists contain-

ing requirements of the Regulations and OCS Orders serve as a basic
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inspection guide.

Although NTLs are useful for clarification of Regu-

lations and Orders, they are also a potentiall source of dispute if they
are used as a means of promulgating additional regulations outside of
the rulemaking procedures mandated by legislation.

A I ist of active

NTLs as of December 1985 is included at Appendix II.
Because of its relative maturity in terms of OCS operations,
the fol lowing discussion of the OCS regulatory structure is referenced
to the Gulf of Mexico unless otherwise specified.

The current body of

MMS regulatory requirements that relate to operations safety during OCS
dri Iling activities are discussed in the following section.
As previously mentioned, the laws that provided the primary
authority to establish the present OCS regulatory regime are the OCS
Lands Act, NEPA, CZMA, and the OCS Lands Act Amendments. 9 The final
rules adopted in 30 CFR 250, Oi I and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the
outer Continental Shelf, contain several elements of the OCS Safety
Program. 10
Section 250.2 provides definitions, used throughout the code,
that are applicable to the entire discussion of OCS safety.

The defi-

nition of "Drilling Operations" means actual operations including the
physical penetration of the seafloor for the purpose of creating a
boreho Ie, test i ng, act i vi ties to demonstrate the capab i II i ty of a we I I to
produce

i I or gas, and the comp Iet ion operat ions needed to malke a we I I
physical Iy ab~e to produce oi I or gas, or both. 11
The distinction of
0

"physical penetration of the seafloor" is significant for determining
the division of regulatory responsibi I ity.

For example, as mentioned

in Chapter 1, MMS has jurisdiction over a semisubmersible dri I I ing rig
only during the time it is in actual physical contact with the seabed.
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"Exploration" means the process of searching for minerals.
Exploration activities include, but are not

I imited to:

(1) Geophysical surveys where magnetic, gravity, seismic, or other
systems are used to detect or imply the presence of such minerals; and
(2) any dri I ling, whether on or off a known geological structure.
Exploration also includes the dril ling of a wei I in which a discovery
of oi I or natural gas in paying quantities

IS

made and the dri II ing of

any additional wei I, after a discovery, which is needed to del ineate a
reservoir and to enable the lessee to determine whether to proceed with
development and production. 12 The significance for this discussion is
the fact that many of the DeS regions that are experiencing technological advances are the same areas that are primari Iy in the exploration stage.

There should be a direct relationship between operations

in these areas and the development of alternative technologies requiring Best and Safest Technologies (BAST) determinations to be made.
Although it took place prior to the codification of BAST, the regulation requiring the installation of subsurface safety valves provides a
good example of how such a relationship could be developed for making
BAST determinations, and is

actua~

Iy a precursor of BAST.

Subsurface

safety valves were introduced commercially in 1954, and until 1973
development of the technology was driven primari Iy by economics, which
resulted in continued technological improvements but not in universal
appl ication.

However, oes Order Number 5-3, establ ished in 1973,

required that subsurface safety valves be instal led on al I producing
wei Is.

This resulted in rapid appl ication of the technology to al I

relevant DeS operations and has sustained an economic cl imate conducive
to continuing refinements and improvements of the technology.13
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The jurisdiction and function of the MMS BAST Program is outlined specifically in the regulations, whereby the MMS Director is to:
Require on al I new and, whenever practicable, on existing dri I I ing and
production operations (including the construction and operation of
platforms and pipel ines), the use of the best avai lable and safest
technologies which the Director determines to be economically feasible,
wherever failure of equipment would have a significant affect om
safety, health, or the environment, except where the Director determines that the incremental benefits are clearly insufficient to justify
the incremental costs of uti I izing such technologies. 14
Currently, OCS Order Number 5 officially implements the MMS
Gulf of Mexico Region's BAST Program.

The Order sets out requirements

for the design, installation, and operation of subsurface safety
devices, surface safety systems, and safety device testing and training
on all platforms and structures located on the leased area.

However,

the actual process by which BAST is carried out is far less clear and
is subject to a great deal of interpretation by al I parties.

Phrases

such as "encouraged to continue the development of ... " and "may be
used ... " in the fol lowing excerpts from Gulf of Mexico OCS Order Number
5 indicate the degree to which the MMS BAST requirement is sti I I in the
early stages of its evolution:

1.
Use of Best Available and Safest Technolo ies
BAST.
e lessee IS encourage to continue t e
eve opment of safety-system technology. As research and product improvement results in increased
effectiveness of existing safety equipment or the
development of new equipment systems, such equipment
may be used and, if such technologies provide a
significant cost effective incremental benefit to
safety, health, or environment, shal I be required to
be used if determined to be BAST.

Conformance to standards} codes} and practices
referenced in this Order wit I be considered to be
the appl ication of BAST. Specific equipment and
procedures or systems not covered by standards}
codes} or practices wi I I be analyzed to determine if
the fai lure of such would have a significant effect
on safety} health} or the environment. If such are
identified and until specific performance standards
are developed or endorsed by the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS)} and as directed by the Supervisor on
a case-by-case basis} the lessee shal I submit information necessary to indicate the use of the BAST}
the alternatives considered to the specific equipment or procedures} and the rationale why one
alternative technology was considered in place of
another. This analysis shal I include a discussion
of the costs involved in the use of ~ch technology
and the incremental benefits gained.
The MMS Certification Requirement used to determine that the
operator is employing BAST takes the form of endorsements included in
exploration and development plans.
that BAST is to be employed.

The lessee is required to state

BAST is in use if the lessee adheres in

all respects to OCS Orders} or has MMS approval for specific items of
noncomp I .lance. 16
The effectiveness of this type of implementation strategy
appears to be limited by the capabi lity of MMS personnel to successfully assess the technologies in question.

The following discussion of

how the BAST requirement has evolved and how it was originally intended
may help to determine if this is the case.
Background of the BAST Reguire.ent
Concern over the adequacy of Federal regulatory procedures to
govern oi I and gas operations on the OCS in a safe and efficient manner
caused Congress to include several related safety provisions in the
1978 OCS Lands Act Amendments.

The Section 21(b) mandate for a program

to assure that technologies be continuously and systematically reviewed
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In order that BAST are applied to DeS operations was coupted with a
stud~

requirement in Section 21(a) of the Act that stated:
Upon the date of enactment of this section, the
Secretary and the Secretary of the Department in
which the Coast Guard is operating shal I, in consultation with each other and, as appropriate, with the
heads of other Federal departments and agencies,
promptly commence a joint study of the adequacy of
existing safety and health regulations and of the
techno logy, equ i pment, and techn i ques ava i I, ab I e for
the exploration, development, and production of the
minerals of the outer Continental Shelf. The
results of such study shall be submitted to the
President who shall submit a plan to the Congress of
his proposals to promote safety and health in the
exploration, development, and produclton of the
minerals of the outer Continental Shelf.
The so-called Section 21(a) Report was eventually presented to

the President in 1984 as a response to an assessment of the adequacy of
regulations and technologies on the OCS entitled, "Safety and Offshore
Oil," that was published in June 1981 by the Marine Board, acting for
the National Research Counci I (NRC).18
Pr ior to the re I ease of either of the above ment i, onedreports,
MMS had requested that the NRC suggest a strategy for the agency to use
in carrying out its new responsibi I ities under the 1978 OCS Lands Act
Amendments.

In that strategy, issued in December 1978, the Marine

Board cautioned that "Because different technologies may be necessary
in different situations ... there are no best available and safest technologies for universal appl ication to al I offshore oi I and gas development operations."19

Accordingly, the Marine Board observed that it was

not incumbent and, indeed, has not been the practice of MMS or the USCG
to

spec~fy

through regulation, a particular technology or technologies

as the "best and safest" to be in compliance with the statute.

This

was reiterated in the Federal Register Notice of Apri I 9, 1986, where
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MMS states that they ·Wit I not be certifying any technology, equipment,
or procedure as the best avai lable and safest.· 20

During the comment

period, MMS solicited information and detai Is on new technologies that
would "assist in the safe and expeditious exploration and development
of the leasable minerals of the OCS."21

The comments were sol icited

for technologies that were considered by MMS to incl'ude equipment
and/or procedures.

The information received by MMS was to be used to

ensure that the agency is aware of currently available technologies and
that BAST is being reflected in their regulations.

A significant ques-

tion to consider is whether or not MMS is fulfi I ling the legislated
intent of the BAST requirement by employing this methodology to
determine the adequacy of their regulations.

To address this question,

the role of the Section 21(a) Report must be examined in its relationship to the development and implementation of BAST.

Timing of the Section 21(8) Study
Section 21(a) cal led for the study to be commenced promptly
upon the date of enactment of the amendments to the law. 22 Although
Congress had presumably intended that the study be undertaken within a
reasonable amount of time, the 1978 OCS Lands Act Amendments did not
spectfy a completion date for the report.

A rough indication of the

amount of time considered necessary to complete the study can be found
in H.R. 1614, introduced in January 1977 by Representative John Murphy
of New York whose version of the OCS bi I I assigned the study to the
National Academy of Engineering, and provided that the results be submitted "not later than nine months after the date of enactment ... "23
That the study and resulting regulatory plan precede imptementation of
the BAST requirement was impl icit in H.R. 1614.
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It was argued that,

without the results of the study, the balancing of relevant economIc
factors used in the process of determining BAST could be considered too
lightly and thereby introduce additional bias into the study.

More

importantly, premature implementation of Section 21(b) would not
improve the "bureaucratic nightmare" of uncoordinated Government action
the House OCS Committee intended to relieve by requiring the study.24
The legislative history clearly shows that a sequential appl ication of
Section 21(a) fo! lowed by Section 21(b) was intended by Congress.
However, such a mandate was not explicitly stated in the Amendments as
they were finally enacted.
Also of significance to the issue of timing is the fact that
the scope cal led for in the study reached far beyond the appl ication of
BAST.

In fact, because the BAST requirement was primari Iy intended to

be incorporated into the existing regulatory framework, it could
usually be implemented by simply issuing procedural rules rather than
promulgating entirely new regulations.

Where this was possible, Sub-

section 21(b) would be implemented as soon as BAST procedures and
determinations were made whi Ie, at the same time, the importance of the
study could be recognized if, after initial BAST appl ication, the
incremental implementation was effectuated in logical and easi Iy
identifiable instances which had been sufficiently studied. 25
Participants in

t~e

Study

Subsection 21(a) stated that the MMS and the USCG wi II be the
agencies directly responsible for the study.

A provision for "Consul-

tation with each other and, as appropriate, with the heads of other
Federa I departments and agenc ies ... " was inc Iuded. 26

However, because

no other Federal agencies had substantive responses to the cal I for
24

comments on the assessment, 'Safety and Offshore Oi I,' the content of
the report was confined to the responses of the MMS and the USCG and
consisted of a series of papers written by appropriate members of the
task group selected for their particular expertise, background, and
'knowledge of the OCS regulatory process. 27
The question of who was to participate in the report preparation is further clouded by the rather vague language used in the Amendments.

Early versions of the Senate bill included the DoL, more

specifically OSHA, to participate in the generation of the study.28
The "joint study" cal led for in Section 21(a) is subsequently referred
to as "such study,' which raises the question of what was intended:

a

single document produced by MMS and USCG personnel working together, or
a concurrent effort by each agency to produce a study of issues under
the purview of their respective jurisdictions?

The adjectives "joint"

and "such" seem to indicate a sing'le study produced by both agencies,
although it then seems redundant to specifically require that the MMS
and the USCG consult with each other if only one study was intended.
In any case, the product was a single study, in which some responses
represent a single agency and others are joint MMS and USCG responses.
Regardless of the legislated intent of Section 21(a) as to who
the participants in the study were to be, it appears that the MMS and
the USCG performed their mandated functions satisfactori Iy.

On June 5,

1981, the NRC completed its assessment and publ ished "Safety and Offshore Oil" which provided the foundation of the Section 21(a) Report. 29
On June 25, 1981, a request for comments was published in the Federal
Register 30 .

It announced the completion of the NRC assessment and

requested comments from the public, industry, state governments, and
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interested parties on the following concerns:

technological development, human element, information, research, and environment. 31 Then,
during September of 1981, copies of "Safety and Offshore Oi I" and the
Federal Register Notice were sent to the Federal agencies that Dol
thought might be interested in the Marine Board Study.

When the

comment period ended, only 20 comments had been received, resulting in
the fol lowing mix of interested parties: 32
Oi I and Gas Industry

- 12

Pipel ine Industry

3

Maritime Industry

1

Environmental Interest -

2

Individuals

1

As previously mentioned, there were no substantive comments received
from Federal agencies.

In fact, the only response was from the USACE

who stated that they would concur with whatever comments were made by
the USCG.

Through this action, the MMS and the USCG had fulfi I led the

mandate of consulting with the heads of other Federal departments where
appropriate.

Organization of the Section 21(a) Report
The NRC assessment, "Safety and Offshore Oi I'," is divided into
a number of topical areas in which individual concerns are discussed in
detail.

At the end of each discussion, there

"Findings" or "Findings and Recommendations."

IS

a section entitled,

The MMS and USCG task

group charged with producing the Section 21(a) Report based its findings on the content of these sections in ·Safety and Offshore Oi I."
The

fol~owing

discussion summarizes the safety-related issues addressed
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In the Section 21(a) Report that related to the current MMS and USCG
regul1atory regime.
An underlying consideration for the appl ication of BAST IS the
coupl ing of resource discovery and technological development.

As a

result of additional hydrocarbon discoveries, industry wi I I be challenged to develop new technologies for the exploi,tation of these additional reserves .In new areas. 33 The assumption made by the agencies
regulating oes activities is that, historically, the oi I industry has
been successful at developing appropriate technologies when given
reasonable incentives.

The DeS leasing process is one area that MMS

provides such incentive, offering extended lease terms for deepwater
tracts that may require the use of innovative technology.
Regulation is another area that MMS may provide incentive for
technological development.

Proposed changes to the rules appl icable to

oes safety wi I I be discussed in Chapter 3.

The current rules, in the

form of oes Orders, are considered by MMS to be dynamic and may be
revised as advances are made in knowledge of the operating environment
and technology.

However, the perception that it is incumbent upon the

offshore industry to keep the regulating agencies appraised of such
advances in order that timely revisions can be made to the oes Orders,
appears to have been ineffective.

Many oes Orders have not been

revised in more than 10 years and some new requirements are proposed in
response to recommendations made by accident investigation panels and
others. 34
Workplace Safety Data Collection and Infor..tion Program
In addition to issues concerning the implementation of the
BAST requirement, the Section 21(a) Report also addressed a recommenda27

tion that the collection of workplace safety data be improved.

The

National Research Counci I J s Marine Board Commission on Engineering and
Technical Systems established a Committee on Outer Continental Shelf
Safety Information and Analysis in response to a request by MMS in June
1982.

The resutting report, entitled, "Safety Information and Manage-

ment on the Outer Continental Shelf," was publ ished by the National
Academy Press in 1984. 35 The fol lowing discussion of how OCS safety
information management can be improved is based on several findings of
the study.
MMS

IS

at a disadvantage In its efforts to motivate industry

to conduct safe operations and to obtain basic safety data because it
limits its authority to the operator or lessee.
on the OCS

IS

Since much of the work

conducted by contractors, MMS has no contact with these

companies and must rely on the operator or lessee for information concerning the safety of their operations.

MMS could choose administra-

tively to request information necessary from al I contractors but
probably should target its efforts with those companies that are
involved in operations having significant safety problems.
Federal regulatory influence over OCS safety is primari Iy
manifested through the industry.

Therefore, the government needs

reliable casualty information so that the effectiveness of the procedures implemented to achieve the goals of the pol icies it sets can be
determ,ined.
8

A useful safety information system needs to record data in

manner that reflects both the frequency of occurrence and the

severity of events.

The data also need to be in a form that is con-

ducive to analysis.

Monitoring safety performance -- the abi I ity to

document safety results and trends and to quantify the effects of
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policies and regulations -- is central to fulfi I I ing the Minerals
Management Service's role i'n achieving OCS safety.36
MMS already has implemented many of the components of a safety
information system but the program has several missing elements.

A

fundamental weakness is that worker population data (such as histories
of experience and training) for the entire OCS workplace are not collected.

This means that the exposure data are not as complete as the

event data, making analysis difficult.

The International Association

of Drilling Contractors (IADC) data, on the other hand, includes
exposure information that al lows frequency rates for lost time accidents to be calculated.

This al lows the accident rates to be normal-

ized by a standard unit; in this instance, man hours of exposure.

The

potential value of this "normal ized data" wi I I be illustrated in
Chapter 3.

Comparable, OCS-specific frequency-rate statistics cannot

be developed as readi Iy from MMS or Coast Guard data because information on exposure, i.e., man hours on the OCS, is lacking. 37
There are two other major deficiencies with the MMS safety
information and management system.

The raw data is contained in the

events file, establ ished in 1970 by the Gulf of Mexico

reg~on.

Since

that time, OCS operations have taken place off the coasts of Alaska,
California, and in the Atlantic but the geographic coverage of the
historical data is complete only for the Gulf of Mexico.

The second

limitation of the system is the relatively primitive state of development of the data base.

Other than simple sorting operations, by year

or type of accident, for example, analysis can only be accompl ished
through special study.38

29

MMS has establ ished a computerized accident information
management system at its national headquarters in Reston, Virginia.
The program is still under development and shoutd eventually solve the
problems described above.

However, the Gulf of Mexico is sti I I the

only OCS region that has a complete data file since 1970.
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Chapter 3

PRESENTATION AN> ANAlYSIS OF THE SAFETY DATA
Introduction
Three data sets have been collected for the period 1975-1985.
The International Association of Dri I I ing Contractors (IADC) information has been gathered from annual Accident Statistics Task Group
reports obtained from the IADC Accident Prevention Subcommittee In
Houston, Texas.

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) Office of

Merchant Marine Safety in Washington, DC, provided annual summaries of
casualties that have been included in their Marine Safety Information
System.

The Minerals Management Service (MMS), Offshore Rules and

Operations Division, located in Reston, Virginia, was used as a source
for safety data that has been stored in their OCS Events Fi Ie.

lADe Data
The IADC Accident Prevention Subcommittee tabulates worldwide
annual safety information from participating member companies.

It is

the only set of information that inclludes man hours of exposure (MHE),
which enable the data to be normal ized.

MHE is defined as the total

number of hours that those personnel working on dril ling operations are
subject to occupational hazards and thereby exposed to risk.

For

example, a roughneck typically works 12 hours, then has 12 hours off.
Therefore, in each 24-hour period, the roughneck on a dri I I ing location
contributes 12 MHE to the total of the operation.

Whi Ie the number of

people working on an offshore rig varies dai Iy, a MHE count of 1,000
would not be unusual for a 24-hour period.

Injuries and fatal ities

resulting from the catastrophic fai lure of offshore faci I ities clearly
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skews the results of an MHE normalized data base.

However, the use of

MHE as a measure of the average level of intensity that the industry

IS

performing at over the course of a given year al lows comparisons to be
made between years.
The annual tabulations received from the IADC have been
grouped according to the type of dri II ing category.

The categories

selected were for dri I I ing contractors that operated domestically on
land as wei I as in state and federal waters.
lADC uses the

dril~ing

To collect the data the

contractors' accident reports that are sent in

each month as part of a voluntary safety program.

The original source

of the information is the hour1y log or -Chari ie Report- fil led out by
the dri Ilers during each tour or shift.
The lADC data set includes land-based accident information to
al low

comparisons to be drawn between the entire domestic dri I ling

industry.

The products of this effort is Table I, which shows yearly

frequencies for lost time accidents (LTA) during the period 1975-1985.
The lADC definition of LTA is an injury that causes an employee to miss
at least 12 hours of work.

Frequency rate is the number of LTA occur-

ring in 1,000,000 MHE, while incidence rate expresses the occurrence of
LTA per 200,000 MHE.

The lADC used the term frequency rate exclusively

unti I 1982 when incidence rates were also calculated and appeared in
their annual summaries.

Incidence rates may be obtained by simply

dividing the frequency rates by five.

The use of incidence rates

al lows the more subtle differences in the data to be graphically highI ighted on scales having a far sma I ler range.

However, because the

incidence rate numbers are five times lower than the frequency rates,
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TABlE 1
LOST TIME ACCIDENTS OF 12 H(US OR GREATER EXPRESSED
AS FREqueNCY RATES (PER 1 MILLION MAN HOURS)

YEAR

U.S. LAND

u. S.

U.S. OFFSHORE
I

I

1975
1976
1977 II
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

59.13
56.17
59.80
63.65
58.08
57.76
49.35
40.32
50.32
60.62
51.96
SOURCE:

I

41.85
59.17
46.57
49.68
45.66
40.94
34.06
26.44
20.99
24.95
18.54

COMBINED LAND

At«) OFFSHORE

51.63
57.17
54.38
58.08
53.12
52.19
44.16
34.90
36.56
44.69
36.57

International Association of Dri I I ing Contractors,

"Accident Safety Statistics Reports," Houston, TX, 1986.

The offshore

data includes State Waters and Federal Outer Continental Shelf areas.
NOTE:

Accident rates for offshore areas generally decl ined

over the period 1975-1985.
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the

lADe

may be attemptiog to minimize the importance of the results

through the use of statistical manipulation.
The IADC data have several significant I imitations.

For

example, only injuries that occurred to dri I I~ng contractor (and subcontractor) personnel are inciuded in this data set.

Also, the off-

shore information includes incidents that occurred in both state and
federal waters.

Although these data are the most complete avai lable,

they represent only a percentage of reporting from member contractors
who participated in a voluntary program.

Reporting percentages ranged

from a low of 69 percent of contractors in 1980 to a high of 100 percent in 1984. 1 Because more than two-thirds of the member companies
reported every year, the data are assumed to be a representative survey
of the entire population and therefore statistically val id.

It is

possible, however, that the poorest safety performers were not sampled,
which could skew the results.

Simi lar data sets, such as the OSHA

safety information discussed in Chapter 1, are not avai lable in an
offshore-specific format, which would al low for a comparison of the two
safety records during the study period.
The codes of the IADC member companies participating in the
program vary from year to year.

This is unfortunate because it pre-

cludes the analysis of a small, but consistent sample of contractors
throughout the 10-year period that could have provided a valuable control group.

Comparisons drawn between the sma I I sample and the entire

population of participating member companies would have given additional credibi lity to the use of the IADC data base.
The reporting of IADC fatalities was not itemized for offshore
events during the years 1975 through 1979.
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The fatal ity totals for

those years are aggregates of domestic land and offshore occurrences as
wei I as foreign events, and therefore have not been incl'uded in the
presentation of the three data sets.

The IADC offshore fatal ity infor-

mation is presented in Table 2.
USCG Data
The USCG data represents only a partial, voluntary reporting
of events to the Marine Safety Office that have been included in the
Coast Guard's Marine Safety Information System.

An operator or dri I l-

ing contractor was not required to report LTA to the Coast Guard unti I
1982.

Prior to that date, some of the events that were reported by

industry did not fit into specific categories and were never entered in
the safety information data base.

The 1982 requirement represents the

lag time between the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments
and the promulgation of the more detai led accident reporting regulations mandated by the Act.

The totals of reported LTA and fatalities

for the years 1975 through 1979 are, according to the Commandant of the
Marine Safety Office, admittedly tow and probably do not accurately
portray the safety situation that existed during that period. 2 In 1980
the USCG changed their data file format by expanding the various categories of accident type.

The new format enabled the information to be

computerized, which al lowed more of the reported data to be used for
analysis.

The net result was an increase in the number of LTA from

that year forward.

The USCG data presented here was obtained by mai I

and telephone and has been presented in the same format as received
from the Marine Safety Office.
LTA criterion for USCG data is a 72-hour incapacitation, which
may partly account for the sma I ler numbers than found in the IADC data.
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TABlE 2
OFFSHORE FATALITIES, MAN HO~S OF EXPO~E, AND FATALITY
OCC~ENCE RATIO PER MILLION MAN H(6S OF EXPOSURE

FATALITIES

I

MAN HOms OF EXP05mE

YEAR

FATALITIES

MAN H(US OF EXPOSURE
CM i I lions)

1980

10

37.077

0.27

1981

8

43.599

0.18

1982

8

46.558

0.17

1983

5

43.456

0.11

1984

10

51.220

0.19

1985

37

47.896

0.77

SO~CE

OF FATALITY AND EXPOSURE DATA:

(Mi II ions)

International Associa-

tion of Dri I I ing Contractors, "Accident Safety Statistics Reports,"
Houston, TX, 1986.

The data includes State Waters and Federal Outer

Continental Shelf areas.
NOTE:
specific.

Prior to 1980, IADC fatality data was not offshore-

In 1984 the fatality occurrence ratio was 0.19 fatal ities

per mi I I ion man hours of exposure.

In 1985 the ratio increased to 0.77

whi Ie the exposure declined by more than 3.3 mi II ion man hours.

Possi-

ble causes of this increase in fatalities are discussed in the analysis
section of this chapter.
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However, a conclusive determination of this is not possible because of
the voluntary nature of the IADC reporting system and the fact that
reporting was not mandatory to the USCG unti I 1982.

There is also no

USCG-generated wor'ker popu Iat i on data that enab I, es the acc ident data to
be normalized.

Therefore, the Coast Guard information wi I I be pre-

sented together with the MMS data.

In addition, the offshore data

includes both state and federal waters and the reported events include
diverse transportation and vessel operation activities .
...5 Data

MMS requires accident reporting under the authority of 30 CFR
250.45 and 33 CFR 153.203.

The objective of these regulations is to

provide the necessary information for taking corrective and preventive
actions that reduce or eliminate the I ikel ihood of recurrence.

The

term "accident" includes oi I spi I Is as wei I as fires, personal injuries
and death, structural fai lures, and other malfunctions.

Des

Order No.

7, Section 2.3, stipulates that the lessee is required to fi Ie an accident report within 10 days of the date of occurrence.
accidents of 72 hours or greater are to be reported.

AI I lost time
The lessee must

immediately notify the district supervisor of al I serious accidents,
any death or serious injury, and al I fires.
regulations are to be reported immediately.

Discharges in violation of
Corrective or preventive

actions may include the issuance of a notice to lessee, wei I shut-in,
investigation, or revision to regulations.
MMS data are concerned with events that occurred on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) involving dri I ling, production, and workover
activities.

The MMS data was compi led from a specially requested run

of the events file obtained from the Offshore Rules and Operations
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Division in Reston, Virginia.
the data set.

No population information exists within

However, several sources of DeS statistics could poten-

tially be used to normalize the data.

These include the annual number

of boreholes dri I led, production figures, and the number of wei I starts
in a given year.

Although not as appropriate an indicator as the lADe

man hour data, the wei I starts information appears to provide the most
reliable comparison of the level of oes dri I I ing activity that is
avai lable from a federal agency.

Table 3 presents the relationship

between oes wei I starts and MHE for the study period.

With the excep-

tion of a decrease from 1975 to 1976, the annual trend has been a consistent increase in the average number of MHE per wei I start.

This

seems to indicate that it took longer to dri I I wei Is, or was a decrease
in the efficiency of oes drilling operations from 1976 to 1985.
One variable that is not taken into account in this analysis
is average wei I depth, which can generally be assumed to have increased
during the study period.

Over time, the better dri I ling prospects are

typically found further offshore in deeper water or simply in deeper,
unexplored formations.

However, specific wei I depth data for severat

DeS planning areas do not illustrate this trend and are shown in Table
4.

Despite the influence that well depth probably has on these data,

it is possible that oes safety regulations implemented during the study
period have contributed to the increase in the per wei I MHE and therefore to the relationship between operational efficiency and accident
rates.

Testing, required inspections, and other time-consuming opera-

tions al I add to the total MHE during a given dri I I ing project.
Acknowledging these limitations, the

we~1
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starts and MHE data wi I I be

TABlE 3
WELL STARTS AND MAN HDmS OF

I

YFAR

WFII ~11Uf1~(a)

MAN H~S(e~

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

841
1,086
1,220
1,139
1,109
1,079
1,109
1,159
1,066
1,136
1,040

18,663,520
18,184,585
28,834,239
36,173,267
36,043,946
37,077,474
43,599,536
46,558,981
43,456,679
51,220,414
47,896,128

EXPO~E

AVERAGE
MAN HDmS OF EXP~~E
PER WEll ~IAK

c

I

22,192
16,745
23,635
31,759
32,501
34,363
39,314
40,172
40,766
45,088
46,054

SOURCES:

(a)

Minerals Management Service, Federal Offshore Statistics:

1985 (Washington, D.C.: 1987, OCS Report 87-0008), p. 72, TABLE 65.
Includes Federai Outer Continental Shelf areas only.
(b)

International Association of Dri I I ing Contractors, "Acci-

dent Safety Statistics Reports," Houston, lX, 1986.

Includes State

Waters and Federal Outer Continental Shelf areas.
(c)
NOTE:

Calculated from (a) and (b) to illustrate trend.
With the exception of 1976, there has been an increase

in exposure per wei I start every year.

The possible causes of this

trend are discussed in the analysis section of this chapter.
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TABlE 4

AVERAGE WELl. DEPTHS IN TWO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF REGIONS

ALASKA (a)

,

TOTAL

,.

EASTERN Gl1.F OF MEXICO (b)
ucr In

TOTAL

IN FEET

II YEAR WELLS
i

WELLS

I

Ut:t"It1

IN FEET

I

1975

1
4
9
3
3
5

5,150
5,924
13,508
14,153
10,175
11 ,453

--

------

4
4
11
21

13,286
14,367
8,293
9,750

i 1976

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

I

I

10

13,739

--

------

3

14,905

---

------

1
8
1

20,450
12,477
21,068

--

------

--

------

7

17 ,377

------

SOlRCES:
(a)

Minerals Management Service, Alaska Summary Report/Index:

January 1986 - December 1986 (Washington, D.C.:

1987, DeS Information

Report MMS 87-0016), p. 26, TABLE 10.
(b)
Report/Index:

Minerals Management Service, Gulf of Mexico Summary
November 1984 - June 1986 (Washington, D.C.:

1986, DeS

Information Report MMS 86-0084), p. 28, TABLE 11.

NOTE:

Possible relationships between wei I depth and safety

are discussed in the analysis section of this chapter.
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TABlE 5
ACCIDENTS AND FATAlITIES AS REPORTED TO THE llUTED STATES
COAST GUARD AND THE MINERAlS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

MINERAlS MANAGEMENT SERVICE (b)

llUTED STATES COAST GUARD (a)

-

I

YEAR

LOST TIME
ACCIDENTS

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 I

26
40
30
27
16
119
264
677
740
1,057
913

FATAlITIES

LOST TIME
ACCIDENTS

FATAlITIES

12
20
9
3
15
17
13
22
26
25
20

15
18
26
28
20
24
38
363
317
286
334

11
12
12
17
14
15
12
18
8
14
15

I
I

SOURCES:
(a)

Telephone interview with Lt. Commander

Guard, Office of
(b)

~erchant ~arine

~oniz,

United States Coast

Safety, Washington, D.C., August 1986.

Interview with Ulysses Cotton,

~inerals ~anag.ment

Service, Offshore

Rules and Operations Division, Reston, VA, September 1986.
NOTE:

The Increase in the 1980 Coast Guard lost time accident data reflects

a change in reporting format discussed on page 8-6.
Guard and the

~lnerals

Beginning In 1982, both the Coast

Wanage.ent Service required that accidents be reported by

offshore owners, operators, and persons in charge of Outer Continental Shelf Faci lities.
Prior to 1982, the reporting of lost time accidents was voluntary.

The Section 21(a)

Report (discussed in Chapter 2) recommended the mandatory reporting, which was
implemented under the regulatory authority pursuant to the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments.
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used to normalize both the MMS and USCG data in the analysis section.
The MMS and USCG accident and fatality data are shown In Table 5.
Simi lar to the USCG, MMS considers an LTA to be a 72-hour lost
time event to an individual that gets reported and entered in the
Events Fi Ie.

However, because the MMS Events Fi Ie contains data on

production and workover activities as well as dri I I ing operations, the
normal ization of the accident data is more complex than would first
appear.

Also, events may get counted twice because an injury or

fatality is considered to be an event, when it is actually the effect
of an event such as a fal I, blowout, fire, or explosion.

MMS recog-

nizes that such "double counting" is an area of weakness in this safety
reporting and data collection system, but does not appear to have any
solutions at this time.

Partial reporting and incomplete entry into

the data base is also a problem that plagues the successfu:1 use of the
events file for historical analysis, although it was not intended for
that purpose. 3
Despite its I imitations, the Events Fi Ie is an integral component of the MMS Safety Information Program.

Data collected through

this program is made avai lable in annual reports to Congress, pursuant
to 43 USC 1343.

The reports include the number of violations of safety

regulations reported or alleged, investigations undertaken, as wei I as
the results and any administrative or judicial action taken subsequent
to the investigation.

A reported LTA or fatality is often, but not

necessari Iy, the result of a safety violation.

Since the report to

Congress involves regulatory violations, the primary purpose of the
Events fi Ie is to help the agency comply with the Law.

If properly

managed in the future, the data base should ultimately provide infor-
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mation useful for historical analysis.

Data from the Events Fi Ie have

been used during this research because they are the most accurate
source available from

MMS.

Analysis
Trends common to the three sets of LTA data are shown in
Figure 1.

Annual totals for both MHE and well starts are graphed on

separate scales in Figure 2.

The dramatic increase in LTA beginning in

1980 for the USCG and in 1982 for MMS can be primari Iy attributed to
changes in the accident reporting systems of both agencies.

As pre-

viously mentioned, in 1980 the Coast Guard initiated changes in the
manner that accident data was recorded.

These changes al lowed the

information to be computerized and was, therefore, more readi Iy
accessible for safety analyses.
The average number of MHE per DCS wei I start is shown in
Figure 3.

Reasons for the increasing trend of MHE per wei I start wi I I

be discussed later In this chapter.
The 1980 MDU between the

US~G

and MMS defined the particular

areas of interest in which the agencies should concentrate their data
collection efforts. 4 This al lowed the causal information to be correlated with specific accident events.

Past practice had been to

determine only the possible causes, which had the effect of considering
each accident as a discrete experience.

The refinement i'n causal data

categories recognized that accidents often do not have a single cause.
A chain of events, each having a specific cause, typically develops
into an accident.

The recognition that various types of accidents are

frequently caused by a certain chain of events was a fundamental step
in attempting to increase safety through regulatory control.
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FICURE 1
LOST TIME ACCIDENTS AS REPORTED BY THREE DATA SYSTEMS
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International Association of Dri I I lng Contractors, "Acci-

dent Safety Statistics Reports," Houston, TX, 1986.
(b)

Telephone Interview with Lt. Commander Moniz, United

States Coast Guard, Office of Merchant Marine Safety, Washington, D.C.,
August 1986.

(c)

Interview with Ulysses Cotton, Minerals Management Serv-

Ice, Offshore Rules and Operations Division, Reston, VA, September

1986.
NOTE:

Discrepancies arise because the International Associa-

tion of Dri' I ing Contractors uses 12 hours to define a reportable accident for State Waters and Federal Offshore areas whi Ie the agencies use
72 hours to define a reportable accident,

However, the Minerals

Management Service data includes only Federal Outer Continental Shelf
events whereas the Coast Guard data includes both offshore areas.

A

possible cause of the apparent increase in accidents reported to the
Federal agencies between 1980 and 1982 may be the implementation of
revised reporting requirements discussed in this Chapter.
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FIGURE 2
WELL STARTS AND MAN HOURS OF EXPOSURE BY YEAR
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SOURCES:
(a)
International Association of Dri II ing Contractors, "Accident Safety
Statistics Reports," Houston, TX, 1986.
Includes State Waters and Federal Outer
Continental Shelf areas.
(b)
l.Iinerals Management Service, Federal Offshore Statistics:
1986
(Washington, .D.C: 1987, ~CS Report 87-~~~8), p. 72, TABLE 66. Includes Federal Outer
Continental Shelf areas only.
HOTE: Since 198~, the general fit between these curves lends credibi lity to
the methodology of using wei I starts and man hours of exposure to normalize the data.
Reasons for the increase in exposure time on a per wei I basis are discussed in the
analysis section of this chapter.
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FIGURE 3
AVERAGE t.fAN HOURS OF EXPOSURE PER WELL START
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"Accident Safety Statistics Reports,"

Ho~ston,

TX, 1986; and Minerals

Management Service, Federal Offshore Statistics:
D.C.:

1987,

oes

NOTE:

1985, (Washington,

Report 87-0008), p. 72, TABLE 65.
Except for 1976, the yearly trend has been an Increase

In exposure on a per wei I basis.
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The information sought in personnel accidents and injury
reports was further strengthened on August 16, 1982, when the Coast
Guard published an interim rule revising casualty reporting requirements of Title 33, CFR Part 146, and various parts within Title 46,
CFR.

The rule incorporated a revised Coast Guard form, Report of

Marine Accident, Injury, or Death (CG-2692).5

The level of detai I for

personnel accident information collected on this form was substantially
improved from the previous colll,ection form (CG-924E).6
Other evidence supporting the conclusion that the low numbers
of LTA reported to the USCG and MMS prior to 1980 were caused by
changes in format is found in the fatal ity data.

These numbers are far

more consistent throughout the three sets of data during the 1980-1985
period (Figure 4).
sets.

This is particularly true of the IADC and MMS data

The shapes of the fatal ity curves are simi lar, with a low occur-

ring in 1983 followed by a rapid increase.

The discrepancy between the

MMS and USCG data in 1978 is unexplainable but lends support to the
idea that the quality of information has improved since 1980.

The com-

puterized reporting systems now in place probably contributes to the
results being more unified.
Beginning in 1980, the 'USCG fatal ity curve is almost a mirror
Image of the MMS and IADC curves.

This is not surprising because both

data sets should be subsets of the USCG fatal ity totals.

The informa-

tion that is reported to the Coast Guard includes events that occur
during operations that wouJd not be reported to either MMS or IADC.
The problem is that the absolute number of fatalities reported to the
lADC in 1985 is considerably higher than the USCG number for that year.
However, the total number of LTA reported to the USCG in 1985 (Figure
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FIGURE 4
FATALITIES REPORTED BY THREE DATA SYSTEMS.
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SOURCES:
(a)

International Association of Dri I I ing Contractors, "Acci-

dent Safety Statistics Reports," Houston, TX, 1986.
(b)

Telephone Interview with Lt, Commander Moniz, United

States Coast Guard, Office of Merchant Marine Safety, Washington, D.C.,
August 1986.
(c)

Interview with Ulysses Cotton, Minerals Management Serv-

Ice, Offshore Rules and Operations Division, Reston, VA, September
1986.
NOTE:

The numbers of fatalities reported to the Coast Guard

for 1977 and 1978 are lower than those reported to the Minerals Management Service.

Possible reasons for this disparity are explored in the

analysis section of this chapter,
•

The International Association of Dri I I ing Contractors did not tabu-

late offshore-specific fatality data unti I 1980.
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1) is higher than the lADe total.

This is particularly disturbing when

considering that the IADC LTA criteria is a 12-hour injury whereas both
the USCG and MMS use 72 hours of incapacitation to determine the minimum LTA.

The apparent anomaly can perhaps be explained by the number

of non-IADC member personnel injured that the USCG includes in their
overal I marine safety data.

For example, the 1985 USCG data includes

58 LTA entries for offshore service vessels.

If a relatively large

number of those injuries occurred to personnel not counted by the IADC
(anyone who does not work for the dri I ling company or its subcontractors), they would not have been included in the data.
The previously discussed changes in the USCG data collection
and reporting format may also be partly responsible or perhaps some of
the LTA were not counted due to gaps in the cooperative reporting
system between USCG and MMS.

In any event the IADC data seems to be

the most consistent and reliable because their Ireporting format has not
changed substantially during the period of record.
If the assumption is made that the IADC data is the most
rei iable, it al lows for further analysis of the LTA trend.
reported offshore data
from 1975 to 1976.

The IADC

reveals an-increase of 3.46 LTA per 200,000 MHE

This was a nearly 30 percent higher frequency of

LTA incidence over the previous year, and it occurred whi Ie the annual
MHE decreased by more than 2.5 percent.

An increase of 0.63 LTA per

200,000 MHE occurred between 1977 to 1978.

This was a 6.4 percent

higher frequency of LTA incidence in 1978, whi Ie the annuat MHE
increased by sl ightly more than 2 percent.

A gradual decl ine in

reported LTA incidence occurred between 1978 and 1983.

This improved

trend was fol lowed by an increase of 0.79 LTA per 200,000 MHE from 1983
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to 1984, which was a 16 percent increase over the prevIous year.

The

Increase occurred whi Ie the annual MHE rose by more than 15 percent.
It should be noted that in 1976 the incidence rate for offshore areas was higher than for land (see Figure 5).

In all other

years the rates for water pul led down the rates for land but in 1976
this was not the case.

A possible cause of this anomaly may have been

the increase in offshore activity caused by the jump in the number of
tracts leased during 1974 and 1975.

In 1973 a total of 187 tracts were

leased on the OCS, whi Ie the totals for 1974 and 1975 were 356 and 321,
respectively.7

Industry was clearly in a "gearing up" phase in 1976,

so that workers may not have had the necessary experience to conduct
adequately safe offshore operations.
The 16-percent increase of LTA in 1984 can be partly explained
by the expanded offshore activity, which peaked in that year with
51,220,414 MHE.

It is possible that the age of equipment and poor

maintenance practices al'so played a role in the increased LTA incidence
rate.

However, if the level of activity is considered to be the pri-

mary variable the reversal of the trend the fol lowing year could then
be explained by increased contractor competition during 1985 as MHE
dec 'I ined by more than 3.3 mi I I ion.

If the situation described above is

valid, it points out a possible deficiency in the normal ization of the
data by mi I lion MHE.
A similar argument can be made when considering the IADC
fatality data.

Figure 6 shows the number of fatalities per mi Ilion MHE

that occurred between 1980 and 1985.

As noted above, the 1984 total

MHE was 3.3 mi I lion greater than in 1985.

However, the number of

fatalities per mi I lion MHE increased from 0.18 to 0.77.
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This method of

FIGURE 5
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRILLING CONTRACTORS ACCIDENT
INCIDENCE RATES FOR ~ND, OFFSHORE, AND BOTH AREAS COMBINED
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International Association of Dri I ling

Contractors, "Accident Safety Statistics Reports," Houston, TX, 1986.
NOTE:

The three

catego~ies

are included to al low for comparl-

sons of the entire domestic industry.

After peaking in 1976, which is

discussed in the text, the offshore data show a genera I Iy dec lin i ng
trend.

However, whi Ie the yearly trend for land and offshore has been

simi lar, there has been a net decrease in offshore incidence rate over
the study period.

A discussion of whether the reduction in offshore

accident incidence rate may be significant is found in Chapter 4.
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FIGURE 6
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRILLING CONTRACTORS OFFSHORE
FATALITY RATES ~ER MILLION MAN HOURS OF EXPOSURE
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International Association of Drilling Contractors, "Accident Safety

Statistics Reports," Houston, TX, 1986.

NOTE:

The data include events that occurred in State Waters and on the

Federal Outer Continental Shelf.

One possible cause of the dramatic increase from 1984

to 1986 is, among other factors, the diminished avai labi lity of experienced workers, as
discussed in the analysis section of this chapter.
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normalization assumes that an unl imited supply of equally competent
workers are available regardless of the demand.
ever, that tess experienced help
as the total MHE increases.

IS

It is probable, how-

avai lable for offshore employment

It appears that the quality of the off-

shore worker should not be considered a constant.

Improved workforce

training is a logical method of eventualily reducing this problem, but
it does not alleviate the short-ter~ situation caused by inexperience.
Since the reporting of LTA to Federal agencies was not mandatory unti I 1982, the MMS and USCG data provide reasonably simi lar
detai I only from that date forward.

Therefore, one possible conclusion

is that a truly meaningful safety trend can only be established commencing in 1982.

If it took at least until 1982 for the mandates of

the 1978 OCS Lands Act to be effectively translated into the regulations contained in 46 CFR 109.411-413, 33 CFR 146, and 30 CFR 250.45,
it follows that, while the event reporting crucial to safety analyses
has been extremely variable in the past, it is more significant that
they are simi lar from 1982 onward.

However, this raises the possi-

bi I ity that the first hypothesis cannot be proven and that the need for
a better data reporting system and an ongoing safety analysis are
apparent.
The Section 21(a) Report, discussed in Chapter 2, included a
recommendation from the 1981 study, "Safety and Offshore Oi I," that the
USCG and MMS coordinate and strengthen the collection of workplace
safety data.

It specifically suggested that "a single accident report-

ing form collected by a single agency could provide the kind of information needed to gain better understanding of the causal factors and
characteristics of workers that could lead to improved safety."8
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The USCG and MMS have agreed that coordination of their
reporting systems would help to minimize dupl ication of efforts and
point out areas of deficiency in safety data collection.

The agencies

had previously felt that the recommendation for the creation of a
single accident reporting form would be unworkable because of differences In their responsibi lities.

However, the 18 March 1986 Federal

Register contained a proposed MMS rule change under 30 CFR 250 that
would eliminate the requirements for written accident reports. 9 To
comply with the requirements of the OCS Lands Act, as Amended, MMS
would obtain copies of accident reports from the USCG in instances
where reporting is required by Coast Guard rules.

It appears that the
Amendments left enough latitude to al low MMS to do this. 10 One possible benefit of this procedure is that both agencies would be using the
same raw data.

The risk inherent with this type of system is that

chances are increased that the information reported wi I I either be
incomplete or inaccurate.
To safeguard against such an occurrence, the Coast Guard is
considering promulgating additional regulations that would require OCS
leaseholders to submit copies of a log of work related fatal ities,
illnesses, and injuries requiring medical treatment other than first
aid.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires

that leaseholders tabulate and post such a log at the workplace.
A,lthough OSHA does not differentiate between land-based and offshore
drilling, there are two items on this log that would be of benefit to
the oes data collection effort if the offshore information could be
isolated.

First, a lost time accident is considered a period of 24

hours or more.

This is sti I I twice the length of the lADe defined LTA.
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Since the present USeG and MMS DeS accident data collection systems
consider a 72-hour incapacitation a lost time accident, the inclusion
of the 24-hour LTA data would be a great improvement.

The second item

records the severity of the accidents by noting the number of days lost
in each case.

The log is already being generated for DSHA, so if the

Coast Guard required that the DCS-specific information be submitted it
11
would not impose an additional data gathering burden on the employer.
It appears that the Coast Guard wi I I emerge as the lead agency
for col .ecting DCS casualty data.

However, the implementation of a

successful accident reporting and analysis system for DCS accidents is
not imminent. 12 There is sti I I a considerable amount of work that
needs to be done in several areas to

improve the qual ity and accuracy

of the data being reported.
The relationship between DCS safety trends and the price of
crude oi I are shown in Figures 7 and 8.

Figure 7 illustrates several

things, one being that there are major differences in the numbers of
LTA reported by the various groups.

In both figures, the oi I price

curves show that there is a poor correlation between the LTA data and
the price of oi I.
The dramatic increase In the price of oi I between 1979 and
1981 does correspond to simi lar jumps in LTA reported by MMS and USCG.
However, as previously discussed, those increases in LTA are primari Iy
due to changes in reporting formats and requirements.

During the oi I

price decline from 1981 to 1985 the IADC curve shows a general decl ine
in LTA with a notable exception occurring in 1984.

The MMS data indi-

cates a decrease in LTA from 1982 to 1984 but an increase in 1985.
USCG LTA data shows an increase unti I 1984, then decreases in 1985.
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The

FIGURE 7
A COMPARISON OF OFFSHORE LOST TIME ACCIDENTS
AND THE PRICE OF CRUDE OIL
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SOURCES:
(a)
Telephone Interview with the United States Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, Washington, D,C" July 1987; and United States Department of
Energy, Energy Facts, 1986 (Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C.:
DOE/EIA-0469-86), p. 19.
(b)
International Association of Dri I ling Contractors, "Accident Safety
Statistics Reports,· Houston, TX, 1986.
(c)
Telephone Interview with Lt. Commander Moniz, United States Coast
Guard, Office of ~erchant ~arine Safety, Washington, D.C" August 1986.
(d)
Interview with Ulysses Cotton, ~inerals Management Service, Offshore
Rules and Operations Division, Reston, VA, September 1986.
NOTE: The accident data are reported by three separate collection systems,
The International Association of Dri I ling Contractors data uses 12 hours to define a
lost time accident. The Federal Agencies use 72 hours to define a reportable accident.
The poor correlation between the price of oi I and the accident data are discussed in
Chapter 4.
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FIGURE 8
-1

LOST TIME ACCIDENT INCIDENCE RATES AND l1lE PRICE OF CRUDE OIL
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NOTE:

Between 1978 and 1983 accident rates declined whi Ie the price of oi I

increased rapidly, peaked in 1981, and then declined.
between accident data and the price of oi I.
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This indicates a poor correlation

There would probably be an expected lag time between the price
of oi I dropping and a correlation emerging between DeS safety.

How-

ever, the data reported here does not lend itself to a definitive conclusion.

The ramifications of various scenarios will be discussed in

Chapter 4.
Determining the influence that fluctuations in the price of
crude oi I exerts on DCS safety is also
second hypothesis.

~mportant

in addressing the

When the price is high, more exploration occurs in

frontier areas where innovative technologies frequently must be developed.

Industry can afford to develop the equipment and techniques

necessary to meet the safety regulations in these areas.

BAST determi-

nations are made by the regulators as the various choices between technologies warrant such decisions.

A stable or increasing price of oi'

al lows the economic feasibi lity issue of the BAST requirement to not be
an overwhelming problem.
When the price of oi I drops, such as from 1981 to 1985,
industry can generally no longer afford to develop the prospects that
require innovative and expensive equipment.

There have been exceptions

to this trend, such as the continuation of deepwater and Arctic dri I ling projects, but the financia. outlays for these projects began long
before 1981.

The long lead times to first production also add to the

. k an d uncer t aln
. t'les
rls's

0

f fron
t 'ler-area

. I an d gas ac t'IVI. t'les. 13

01

Those risks and uncertainties are directly related to the price of oi I.
When ambitious projects are scaled down because of economic uncertainty, the riskier elements are generally the first to be el iminated.
This tends to short circuit the BAST process in several ways.

The

status quo of routine operations is usually considered adequate by
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industry so that the development of refinements in technology wi I I be
slowed dramatically.
Industry standards that have been accepted as BAST wi I I also
not improve because there is l,jttle incentive to change.

The only

changes instituted are typically due to potential cost savings rather
than increased safety.

In summary, therefore, lower oi I prices appear

to stifle or postpone BAST development in frontier and deepwater areas.
Table 6 shows a comparison between LTA and fatal ity ratios for deepwater Gulf of Mexico

oes

areas and for the entire

oes.

Exploratory wei Is dril led in water depths greater than 1,000
feet during 1984 and 1985 were used as a surrogate for areas that may
have required the most BAST determinations to be made.

The use of

1,000 feet as the criterion for deepwater is somewhat arbitrary.

Defi-

nition of deepwater depends on several factors, including the organization that is asked.
400 meters.
activity.

For example, the MMS definition of deepwater is

However, this definition is in reference to leasing
The offshore oi I and gas industry generally consider any

work in water depths greater than 600 feet to be deepwater opera14
tions.
It has been assumed that 1,000 feet is a water depth that a
significant level of technological advancement was occurring in during
the two years studied.

It should be noted that, except for the LTA

ratio in 1985, the deepwater ratios are larger than the entire population (Table 6).

This indicates that deepwater areas may be more inher-

ent I, y da ngerous than sha I lower areas.

If the BAST requ i rement is be i ng

emp loyed on the ex i st i ng techno Iog i es in water depths I; ess than 1,000
feet perhaps more attention needs to be paid to the deepwater areas.
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TABLE 6
COMPARISON BETWEEN ACCIDENTS AND FATAlITIES IN
DEEPWATER GlI..F OF MEXICO AREAS AND THE ENTIRE OCS

F OF MEXICO OCS ARIEAS WITH WATER DEPTHS QREATER THAN 1 000 FEET (a)
FATAlmES
I
I
RATIO
FATALITIES J
LTA I LTA RATIO
WELL STARTS
YEAR
II

[ll

1984

47

16

0.34

4

0.08

I 1985

56

9

0.16

3

0.05

ENTIRE oes Ali. WATER DEPTHS

(b)

I,

YEAR

WELL STARTS

LTA

1,136

286

0.25

1,040

334

0.32

I

LTA RATIO

FATAlITIES
RATIO

I

FATAlITIES

I

1984
1985

I

I.

0.01

14
I

15

I

0.01

S~CES:

(a)

Minerals Management Service, Federal Offshore Statistics:

1985 (Washington, DC:

1987, OCS Report 87-0008), p. 72, Table 65; and

Interview with Ulysses Cotton, Minerals Management Service, Offshore
Rules and Operations Division, Reston, VA, September 1986.
(b)

Minerals Management Service, OCS Information Program,

Vienna, VA, January 1988.

(Obtained through a request to MMS for a

data fi Ie from the Outer Continental Shelf Information System.)
NOTE:

Except for LTA ratio in 1985, the deepwater data shows

higher event incidence rates.
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The above discussion also lends itsetf to an interesting
policy question.

Is it appropriate for the regulatory bodies responsi-

ble for implementing the BAST requirement to use a sliding sca1e
approach when considering the economic feasibi I ity of a particular
technology?

During boom periods, safety advances are routinely

incorporated as BAST, but in periods of depressed prices should costcutting advances alone be considered BAST without an emphasis on
safety?
The results of the recent past indicate that Government may be
fol lowing such a policy through its implementation of the requirement.
For example, the rescission of the Fai lure and Inventory Reporting
System by MMS in 1982 demonstrated a wi I lingness on the part of

oes

regulators to al low the industry to cut costs even though safety may
have also been reduced. 15

It therefore seems that the BAST require-

ment, as currently instituted, is not achieving its stated goals.
The chief causes of accidents on the
the failure of equipment.

oes

are human error and

Human error may be due to inexperience and

carelessness among other factors.

The fai lure of equipment may be a

design, construction, or maintenance problem.

Obviously, various com-

binations of these causal factors may result in the occurrence of an
accident.
Accident rates could be expected to vary in a certain manner
if a particular causal factor was primari

~y

responsible.

For example,

given a scenario in which equipment is virtually infal I ible, human
error would be the cause of nearly al I accidents.

A prediction could

then be made that during times of high oi I, prices, when there is a high
rig uti lization rate with many new employees, inexperienced workers
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might be the major cause of accidents.

In time, proper worker training

and increased field experience could be expected to bring the rate
down.

This would probably be true only as long as oi I prices remained

stable.
Under the same scenariO, but with low or decl ining oi I prices,
a shrinking of the workforce could be expected.

This would probably

result in a pool of wei I qual ified, experienced workers.

The antici-

pated accident rate would then remain stable or even decrease.

How-

ever, this scenario ignores some obvious contradictions that dictate
national commerce.

In a time of depressed oi I prices the equipment

would not receive the same level of maintenance as during boom periods.
The same can probably be assumed for design and construction programs
as exploration budgets shrink.
If it is assumed that the BAST requirement has not been working effectively and that design, construction, and maintenance problems
are the primary causal factors, accident rates could be expected to
remain high regardless of the price of oi I.

Even if experienced

workers carefully conduct al I operations, accidents caused by equipment
fai lure would sti I I occur.

This scenario demonstrates the vulnera-

bi I ity of an equipment-oriented program such as BAST.

'Worker training

and fami I iarization with new equipment is an important component of the
human error problem.

Having the best equipment is going to reduce

accidents only if workers know how to operate it properly.

Government

procedures to determine BAST should include consideration of equipment
training such as has been done with wei I control.
The determination of the economically feasible element of the
BAST requirement is certainly a difficult task.
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oes safety would

benefit most if the regulators could set safety standards or desired
goals prior to deciding if a technology is economically feasible.
Unfortunately, the implementation process of the policy limits the
realization of those desired results.

The objectives of BAST are

written such that the economic viability of the technologies is the
starting point and achieving the highest possible level of safety with
those technologies is the stated goal.
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Chapter 4

CONCLUSIONS
The Proble.
The problem addressed in this thesis concerns the trends that
can be identified about offshore safety since the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978.

Has the regulatory structure

described in this analysis improved safety during OCS oi I and gas operations?

Is the government capable of assessing best and safest tech-

nologies (BAST)?

Has the implementation of the BAST requirement

achieved its mandated goals in all OCS areas?

First Hypothesis
The issue raised by the first hypothesis is whether the trends
identified in Chapter 3 indicate that OCS safety regulations have been
effective in reducing offshore acci,dents.

It should be emphasized that

neither the MMS or the USCG officials contacted during this research
identified specific safety reduction goals.

The objective of improving

safety was considered to be relative rather than absolute, which makes
it difficult to determine if the regulations have been effective.
However, based on the IADC data, which was the most consistently collected and presented set of information avai lable, the industry
improved its safety record during the study period.

The trend shows a

general, reduction in LTA and the normal ized annual LTA totals were
substantially lower in 1985 than in 1975.

Fatalities reported to the

IADC also showed a decline between 1980 and 1983, but this trend is
contradicted by a fatality rate increase in 1984 and 1985.
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The lADC data are not without limitation, as demonstrated in
Chapter 3.

When compared with the government data, however, the IADC

information is more rei iable.

The changes in reporting format from a

voluntary to a mandatory system, and the sharp increases in LTA that
resulted, jeopardize the uti I ity of the MMS and the USCG data for a
trend analysis throughout the study period.

The fact that the fatal ity

information from al I three data sets more closely match is significant
because the MMS and the USCG have always required the reporting of
fatalities.

One conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a need

to establish a better accident reporting and safety information management system for the OCS.

Improved cooperation and coordination between

the industry and Federal regulators is clearly needed to increase
safety on the DeS.
The proposed regulatory streamlining of the accident reporting
requirements may prove to be a positive step towards achieving the goal
of improved Des safety information management.

However, adequate safe-

guards must be incorporated ilnto the new system that wi I I ensure the
accuracy and thoroughness of the reported accident data.

The proposal

that the eoast Guard will implement the program is fundamentally sound,
given the long tradition of that agency in the area of maritime safety.
The possible use of a log such as that employed by OSHA has
considerable merit, assuming the necessary data for offshore-specific
events can be successfully generated.

MMS input to the process should

focus on providing causal data for events that occur during the actual
exploration and development process, for which that agency has the most
expertise.
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Ultimately, the new safety information management system
shou'd be comprehensive in scope.

Economic forces need to be factored

into the equation so that the total safety picture can be assessed
realistically.

For example, the increase in MHE throughout the study

period may be partly due to economics, but may also be caused by
increased regulation.

Exposure probably increases during equipment

safety testing and emergency preparedness operations, but the additional MHE can be considered to reduce the risk to offshore workers.
It is also difficult to assess the impact that the oi I price
decline during the 1980s has had on accident rates.

Long-term analysis

of safety data and the price of oi I wi I I be needed to accurately determine the relationship between these two factors.

Data from the period

beginning in 1981 and ending in 1985 do not appear to indicate a
discernible trend in this regard.

Perhaps there is a "lag time" effect

acting upon the safety and price relationships.

The lag time effect

may also manifest itself in the maintenance of equipment.

Because the

normal ized MHE increased throughout the study period, LTA rates
decreased, and fatalities decreased until 1983, the increase in fatal ities during 1984 and 1985 could represent the lag time effect (whereby
poor maintenance practices eventually lead to catastrophic fai lures).
The relationship between accident rates and exposure may also
be particularly significant when compared with the price of oi I
throughout the study period (Figures 3 and 8).

Whi Ie the price of oi I

increased between 1975 and 1981, accidents decreased.

Between 1981 and

1985, oil prices dropped slightly, and the approximate slope of the
fal ling LTA curve in Figure 8 is steeper (indicating a more rapid
decrease) than when oi I prices were climbing.
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One conclusion is that regardless of the prIce of oi I,
increased safety regulation wi I I add to the total exposure time of each
well drilled (Figure 9).

This increased exposure wil I occur in addi-

tion to the variations in MHE caused by well depth or complex geology.
Since the accident rates were found to decrease over the study period,
the additional exposure time could be an indication that the regulatory
approach is working.

However, the short period of oi I price decl ine

precludes a definitive finding about this issue.

In any event, it

appears that whatever the price of oi I, equipment failures wi II continue to occur.

This may expl,ain the dramatic increase in fatal ities

during 1984 and 1985.

A longer study period would be needed to see if

those years are normal variations or represent the beginning of a
trend.

Second Hypothesis
The second hypothesis asserts that the BAST requirement has
not successfully reduced the rates of deepwater accidents to the occurrence levels for the entire

oes. The two years in which deepwater data

were compared to events in al I water depths (Table 6) showed that these
areas are not achieving simi lar rates of reduction in accidents and
fatalities.

Whi Ie the brevity of the study period used in this analy-

sis does not lend itself to a quantifiable conclusion in this regard,
it is apparent that more attention should be given to deepwater
technologies.
Several other general conclusions may be drawn from the
information presented.

The objectives of BAST are to ensure the

application of economically viable technologies in the form of equipment, procedures, and systems that achieve the highest level of
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FIGURE 9
AVERAGE MAN HOURS OF EXPOSURE PER WELL START AND
THE PRlCE OF CRUDE OIL BY YEAR
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SOURCES:
(a)
International Association of Drl I ling Contractors, "Accident Safety
Statistics Reports,· Houston, TX, 1986; and Minerals Management Service, Federal
Offshore StatIstics: 1986, (Washington, D.C,: 1987, oes Report 87-0008), p. 72, TABLE
66.
(b)
Telephone Interview with the United States Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, Washington, D.C., July 1987j and United States Department of
Energy, Energy Facts, 1986 (Energy Information Administration, Washington, D,C.:
DOE/EIA-0469-86), p. 19.
NOTE: International Association of Dri Iling Contractors data includes State
Waters and Federal Outer Continental Shelf areas.
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operating safety and reliabi lity possible.

The BAST program is sup-

posed to assess and analyze technology needs and provide a framework to
coordinate the exchange of technological information among regulators.
MMS originally instituted an equipment-specific system for that purpose, the Failure and Inventory Reporting System, but cancelled it in
1982 due to a variety of inefficiencies.
More recently, MMS has implemented BAST through a system of
headquarters and field committees.

The committees identified and

targeted problem areas that need technology assessment and possible
research.

This has resulted in several interesting annual reports on

technology assessment but has not been particularly effective in assuring that DCS operations truly reflect BAST.
Before a given technology is

cons~dered

BAST, it must be

proven that requiring the use of the technology is economically feasible.

This forces the regulatory bodies to place a monetary value on

human safety and welfare.

Is the government really suited to do that?

It is difficult enough to determine best and safest, but to factor
"economically feasible" into the equation seems to make the implementation of BAST unworkable.

For both the USCG and MMS, the BAST require-

ment has been implemented through the incorporation of numerous
sta,ndards, set by members of industry, trade groups, and the scientific
and engineering community such as the American Petroleum Institute and
the American Bureau of Shipping.

At least this approach indicates that

MMS and the Coast Guard recognize that the job is simply too big for
them.
The "economic feasibility" provision of BAST also appears to
have allowed the governmental agencies to administratively streamline
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the regulatory structure at the expense of the intended purpose of the
legislation that established the safety objectives.

The minimal regu-

lation pol,icy of the present administration has effectively reduced the
bureaucratic burden, but may have sent a confusing and inappropriate
signal to the industry.

Whi Ie it is certainly true that the develop-

ment of stringent evaluation and certification procedures

IS

an expen-

sive undertaking for regulators, the purpose of the BAST requirement
was to balance increased costs to the industry with the improved safety
that wou Id resu It.

The nation wou Id be better served by a pol icy that

passes along an additional cost burden to industry (and the publ ic) in
return for achieving a consistent method of assessing and implementing
the best avai lable and safest technologies on the

oes.

If there were no BAST requirement, the industry would have
determined its own safety-to-cost ratio by default.

The implementation

procedures of the BAST requirement dictated that this actually happened
to some degree through the regulatory process.
activity has probably enhanced

oes

While such bureaucratic

safety to some extent, the oppor-

tunity for a self-policing industry may have been lost.

Having the

best equipment is going to reduce accidents only if workers have the
knowledge to operate it properly and are self-motivated to do so.
Since the government has implemented a program that accepts
the industry standards, future regulatory efforts under the BAST
requirement should focus on training and other methods of insti I ling
the motivation necessary to achieve continued safety improvements on
the

oes.

An award and reward approach may be one such method of

implementation, in which the government requires training programs,
evaluates performance, and provides awards and other incentives to the
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industry to police itself.

Therefore, Congress should consider separ-

ating the human element from equipment in future OCS safety legislation.

In this way, government regulators could better differentiate

between worker training and deepwater technologies, which are two
critical outstanding issues identified in this thesis.
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Appendix I
THE ROTARY DRIllING CONCEPT, NOMENCLATmE,
AND POTENTIAL OFFSHORE HAZARDS
When operating offshore, the type of rig used and the way it
IS

moved to and from the dri I ling location depends on whether the

project is an exploration or a deve'lopment wei I.

If the well is

exploratory, particularly in a frontier area, some type of mobile offshore dri I ling unit (MODU) wi I I be used.

MODUs typical of operation on

the OCS are jack-ups, semi submersibles, and dri I I ships.
Jack-up rigs are bui It so that they float when being moved to
or from location.

Because these rigs are relatively unstable whi Ie

under tow, they are subject to a disproportionately high incidence of
acc idents dud ng ri g moves.
lowered down to the seafloor.

Once at the dri: II i ng site, the Iegs are
The platform is then raised or "jacked-

up" on the part of the legs that remain above the water.
the rig is jacked up, the less stable it becomes.

The higher

This can be of

particular concern in areas experiencing large wave heights that dictate the rig must be jacked up a considerable distance from the water
surface.

Current technology limits the practical appl ication of jack-

ups to water depths approximately 350 feet in depth.!
Semisubmersibles consist of two underwater displacement hul Is
upon which the platform floats whi Ie being towed to or from location.
Once on station, the lower sections of the hul Is are flooded enough to
partially submerge the unit so that the focus of buoyancy is beneath
the surface of the water.

Therefore a semisubmersib'Ie floats, but not

really on the water)s surface, providing maximum stabi I ity in rough
seas characteristic of deepwater.

It was the accidental flooding of a
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hull section that was determined to be responsible for causing the
Ocean Ranger to list, and ultimately sink off the coast of Newfoundland
in 1982 resulting in 84 fatalities.
The hul I shapes of dri I I ships are essentially identical to
those of many other oceangoing ships.

The presence of dri I I ing equip-

ment requires several modifications to these vessels that make them
distinctive.

Major design differences include the moon-pool, an

opening mid-ship through which dri I ling operations are conducted, and
ballasting to accommodate the installation of the dri I I ing rig above
the moon-pool.2

Because drill ships are self-propel led they are the

most mobile of al I the MODUs and are generally employed to dri I I
exploratory wells in remote deepwater areas.
There are several other types of MODUs in addition to those
previously described, but they are not commonly used for exploratory
dril I ing on the

oes.

Although there are certain obvious differences

involved in the operation of these three kinds of MODUs, much of the
basic equipment and many of the techniques used in the modern rotary
dri I ling process are surprisingly simi lar.

AI I dri II ing rigs require

power systems that employ some combination of diesel engines and electric motors to drive the rig equipment.

These are referred to as the

compound and may consist of either raw mechanical power or electrical
generators.

The rig equipment includes:

the hoisting and pipe-

handling system, the rotary dri II ing equipment, and the circulation
system.

Each of the major components of these systems wi I I be

described in turn.
The hoisting and pipe-handling system supports the rotary
dri 1,ling equipment over the hole and moves sections of the dri I I string
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and casing from storage racks to the hole.

The basic parts are:

the

tower-like derrick or mast, the blocks and dril ling line, the drawworks
and catheads, pipe-handling equipment, and storage racks.

The derrick

represents potential height-related hazards to personnel, both whi Ie on
the structure from fal Is, and to those working on the rig floor from
fal ling objects.

Either the crown block, the traveling block and hook,

or the drilling line could pose a hazard if they were to fai I under a
given load, particularly during those operations that would involve
many workers being on the rig floor at once.

The drawworks and cat-

heads, being revolving mechanisms, are inherently high in danger
resulting from human error.

Operating either of these pieces of equip-

ment in the presence of the environmental variable rain, increases
dramatically the potential for injury.
Pipe-handling equipment, such as tongs and chains, are often
dangerous because of the precision timing and interaction required by
operating personnel.

Inexperience, carelessness, and fatigue each play

a major role in determining the safe use of such equipment.

Storage

racks are typically a source of crushing type accidents and are often
more dangerous on offshore rigs because of the close proximity to other
working locations that storage areas must be in relative to land-based
rigs.
Although there are parts too numerous to mention, the essential components of the rotating system are described in the fol lowing
discussion.

The swivel is

8

complex piece of equipment consisting of

8

handle-like bai I that fits inside the hook at the bottom of the traveling block.

The swivel itself sustains the weight of the dri I I string,

permits the string to rotate whi Ie maintaining a pressure-tight seal

19

and passageway for dri I ling fluid to be pumped down the inside of the
dri I I string. 3 A hose attached to the side of the swivel called the
rotary hose, al lows dri Iling mud to enter the swivel.

Fastened immedi-

ately below the swivel is a square or hexagonal hoi low pipe cal led the
kelly.

The kelly is typical1y about 40 feet in length and, I ike the

swivel dri Iling fluid, is also pumped through it, on the way to the
bottom.

The reason the kelly is four- or six-sided is because it

serves as a way of transferring the rotating motion of the rotary table
to the dri I I string.

The kelly fits inside a corresponding square or

hexagonal opening in a device ca1 led a kelly bushing, which is part of
the rotary table. 4 The rotary table also contains a master bushing
into which the kelly bushing fits, and is powered either off the compound or by an independent electric motor.

As the master bushing

rotates, the kelly bushing also rotates, which in turn rotates the
kelly.

When the kelly is picked up or disconnected, the kelly bushing

is also removed from the master bushing which then may accommodate a
wedge-I ike device known as the sl ips.

A set of slips is tapered and

lined with strong teeth I ike gripping elements that, when placed around
the dri I I pipe, keep it suspended in the hole when the kelly is disconnected or broken out.

The kelly must be broken out each time a length

of dri I I pipe is added to the dri II string as the hole is dri I led
deeper or when the pipe is run in or out of the existing hole in a
process referred to as tripping.
Drill pipe is steel tubing that comes in lengths of about 30
feet called joints.

Each joint is slightly different in length so that

when pul led in sets (typically of three joints) cal led stands, the
threaded portions, known as tool joints, are not al I at the same

height.

This al lows for a tighter fit when stacked in the derrick pipe

racks where space is a valuable commodity.

The dri I I col lars are

heavy-wal led tubulars located immediately above the bit, that apply
most of the weight necessary to enable the bit to dri I I.

The term

dri I I string refers to the kelly, dri I I pipe, dri I I col lars, and any
other components located between the top dri I I collar and the bit, in a
subsection of the drill string known as the bottom hole assembly (BHA).
It should be emphasized that the entire dril I string is hoi low to al low
for the passage of pressurized dri I ling fluid.

The configuration of

the various components used to make up the BHA may be altered whenever
the dril I string has been tripped out of (removed from) the hole.

Many

of the innovative technologies that have been developed to correct hole
problems or to dri I I directionally are simply variations of the BHA.
Also, much of the measurement whi Ie dri I ling (MWD) technology involves
the use of mud pulsing motors located within a dri I I col tar in the BHA.
MWD provides real time data acquisition capabi I ity and is considered to
be an extremely valuable tool, especially in frontier drill ing applications.
Circulation System
The circulation system

IS

comprised of dri I I ing fluid and the

equipment needed to circulate the fluid throughout the wei I.

The

fluid, known as mud, is custom-designed for each hole, but generally
consists of water, clay, weighting materials, and lesser amounts of
various other additives.
Mud has two main functions:

(1) carrying rock cuttings made

by the bit to the surfacej and (2) holding back natural underground
pressures in order to prevent gas, oi I, or water in the rock formations
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from entering the borehole.

A hole ful I of dri I I ing mud exerts hydro-

static pressure in a manner simi lar to a swimming pool fut I of water
exerting increasing pressure at greater depths.

That is why some

people)s ears hurt when they dive to the bottom of the deep end in a
pool.

The pressure exerted by the mud in the borehole is analogous to

the water in the pool in that it also increases with depth and can
therefore be used to contain the pressures exerted by the formations on
the borehole.

These are the underlying principles of wei I control,

which is an area of the dri I ling operation that is probably the most
critical for safeguarding against catastrophic accidents.
The individual components that make up the circulation system
are shown in Figure 10.

Generally, the mud

into holding tanks cal led mud pits.

IS

mixed through a hopper

The mud pump takes in mud from the

pits and discharges it under pressure into a vertical steel pipe
referred to as the standpipe that is mounted on one leg of the mast or
derrick.

The pressurized mud then flows through a very strong, rein-

forced rubber hose cal led the rotary hose or kelly hose and into the
swivel.

From here, as discussed earlier, the mud travels down the

hollow-stem keHy, dril,1 pipe, and drill collars; and exits at the bit
through the three jet nozzles.

It then does a sharp U-turn and heads

back up the hole in the annulus, which is the space between the outside
of the drill string and the wall of the hole. S Mud leaves the hole
through the mud return line and passes through cleaning equipment which
removes rock cuttings, si It, and sand.

Ideally, the mud circulation

process is a closed system where the mud is circulated through the hole
many times.

Periodicailly, additions of various mud components are made

to make up for losses or to change the properties of the mud to control
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FIGURE 10
THE CIRCUlATION SYSTEM
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SOURCE:

Ron Baker, A Primer of Oil-Well Drilling, 4th ed. (Austin, TX:

Petroleum Extension Service, University of Texas at Austin in cooperation with the
International Association of Drilling Contractors, Houston, TX, 1979), p. 43.
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the changing down-hole environment as new formations (and pressures)
are encountered.

Because mud is such an important part of the dri I ling

operation, specialists design the equipment and plan ingredients for
the mud.

Rig personnel continuously monitor the circulation system,

and with the help of auxi liary mud-cleaning equipment provide the first
line of defense against blowouts.

The circulation system is closely

tied to the wei I control system and is, in fact, the primary method of
preventing the intrusion of formation fluids into the wei I bore. 6
A hole ful I of dri II ing fluid that is properly conditioned and
has a mud weight sufficient to exert slightly greater pressure on the
formation than is being exerted on the bore hole is ideal and is known
as a balanced dri Iling situation.

There is a fine line between achiev-

ing balanced dri I ling and losing circulation to the formation.

This

may occur at any depth, wherever the total pressure against the formation exceeds the total pressure of the formation, and the openings in
the formation are about three times as large as the largest particles
found in quantity in the mud. 7

lost circulation can be a very costly

problem and serious efforts are made to prevent its occurrence including making a di I igent attempt at maintaining balanced dri II ing.
However, the danger of formation fluids intruding into the
wei I bore also increases as mud weights decrease.

Once formation

fluids enter the wei I bore a potentially dangerous condition referred
to as a kick is underway and must be properly alleviated to avoid a
loss of well control.

The first warning that a kick has occurred is

usually an increase in the (returning) flow rate of dril ling mud that
leads to a gain in pit vo'ume.

Or, mud may flow out of the wei I even

when the pumps are not in operation.

Rig personnel are responsible for
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spotting these sometimes subtle anomalies and taking preventative
action.

This is an important factor to remember when considering

legislated safety regu'lations.

Intangibles, such as personality, mood,

and training aptitude may al I come into p'lay in the split second timing
frequently required to maintain safe operations.

It is at this point

that the second line of defense against the loss of wei I control is
employed.

The two basic types of blowout preventers (BOPs) are annular

and ram.

They are arranged in what is known as a BOP stack and

together with a series of valves, cal led the choke manifold, make up
the well control equipment.

BOPs are large high pressure remotely con-

trol led valves that when closed, form a pressure-tight seal at the top
of the wei I and prevent the escape of fluids.
The annular preventer is usually mounted at the very top of
the BOP stack.

It gets its name because when activated, it seals off

the annulus between the dri I I pipe or kelly and the side of the
bore. 8

we~f

The annular preventer may also be used to seal off an open

hole, a condition that exists periodically throughout the dri I ling
operation, such as when the dri II string has been tripped out of the
well to change the bit.

Below the annular preventer in the BOP stack

is a series of up to four ram-type preventers, so cal led because the
rubber-faced blocks of steel are rammed together to seal off the wei I,
much like a couple of fighting rams butting heads. 9 Of the ram-type
preventers there are typically two sets of bl ind rams, which seal off
the open hole, and two sets of pipe rams, which have a semicircular
section cut out to al tow sealing of the hote whi Ie dri I I pipe is in
use.

Usually, only the annular preventer wi I I be closed when the wei I
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kicks, but should it fai I, or should it be necessary to use special
techniques, the ram-type preventers are used as a backup.l0
On fixed platforms, barges, and jack-up rigs the BOPs are
attached to the top of the wei I beneath the rig floor (as on land-based
rigs).

On floating rigs the preventers are mounted on the wei Ihead at

the seafloor which creates some additional pressure control problems
that must be mitigated.
Closing off the flow within the welt with the BOPs is only the
first step that must be taken to successfully dissipate or ki I I a kick.
In order to resume dri I I ing, the kick must be circulated out and mud of
the proper weight to again achieve a balanced condition must be pumped
in to replace it.

Therefore, the choke manifold is used to maintain a

relatively constant pressure while the kick is circulated out.

The

valves start out being nearly fully open and are slowly closed as the
heavier kill weight mud is pumped down the dri I I string whi Ie the kick
moves up the annulus.

In simplified terms, the choke opening is con-

tinuously reduced in size by an amount that retains just enough backpressure to al low the mud that has been cut by the kick to move up and
out of the hole but prevents further entry of formation fluid into the
well bore.
There are several differences in the use of chokes depending
on whether the BOP stack is on the surface or at the seafloor.

Gen-

erally, the choke operator must compensate for the hydrostatic pressure
present due to the water depth after the kick has reached the seafloor
when a subsea BOP stack is in use.

Special training that includes the

use of simulators is required by MMS to prepare dri I ling crews for such
activities.

There are many other items of equipment needed to dri I I
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wells on the

DeS.

However, the prevIous description should provide a

sound basis from which to thoroughly review offshore safety.
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Appendix II

GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION, ACTIVE NOTICE
TO LESS.EES AS OF DECEMBER 1985
Date

No.

Title

85-9

Corpus Christi District Address, Office Hours, and Phone Call
Procedures
Minimizing Oil and Gas Structures in the Gulf of t-olexico
L:1fayetce District Address, Office Hours, and Phone Call Procedures
Lake Jackson District Address, Office Hours, and Phone Call
Procedures
Houma District Address, Office Hours, and Phone Call Procedures
Effect of Drilling Window Approvals

85-8
85-7
85-5
85-3
85-2
84-5
8+3
84-1
83-5
83-3
75-3
82-8
82-7
82-5
82-4
81-5
81-1
80-12
80-9
80-8
80-6
80-5
79-13
79-10

Establishment of Corpus Christi District Office
Lake Charles District Address, Office Hours, and Phone CJll
Procedures.
Outer ContinentJI Shelf Development Operation Coordination
Documents

12/2/85
11/26/85
8/12/85
4/15/85
2/14/85
2/4/85
11/21/84
9/12/84
2/1 0/84
10/31/83

Metairie District Office Hours and Phone Call Procedures
Outer Continental Shelf ShJllow Hazards Requirements for the
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region

9/7/83

Revision No. I
Outer Continental Shelf Cultural Resource
Requirements for the Gulf of ~'1exico OCS Region

10/1/82

Interim Minimum Requirements for Marldng of Equipment
Clarification of Requirements of SubpJragraph 5.7, Safety Device
Training, of OCS Order No.5, "Production Safety Systems"
Suspension of the Failure and Inventory Reporting System (FIRS)
Program Reporting Requirements
Reorganization Announcement
Minimum Requirements for Clearance of Location After Plugging
and Abandonment of Wells
Termination of Report - \lajor \Vell Shut Ins
FIRS Reporting Infonnation
Reporting of Pipeline DJmage
Annual Review of Field Rules
Outer Continental Shelf Environmental Report Guidelines for
the Gulf of ~lexico OCS Region
Planning and Conduct of Operarions in rhe Vicinity of Exjstin~
Pipelines and 0 ther Hazards
Furnishing Food, Quarters, and Transportation to USGS Personnel
Relief from Compliance with Certain Requirements of OCS Order
No. 13
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8/30/82
8/13/82
4/20/82
4/19/82
4(24/81
2/2/81
12/17/80
10/6/80
7/30/80
6/2/80
5/29/80
12/21/79
10/25/79

1\0.

Title

Date

78-5
78-4
78-3
78-2
78-1

Royalty Payment on Vented Q.nd Flared Gas and Gas or Oil, or
Both, Leaked, Spilled. or Used in Producing Operations
API RP 14C, Second Edition, January 1978
Infonnation Available on Well No.2, OCS-G 3111
Value of Natural Gas for Royalty Purposes
Value of Natural Gas Liquids for Royalty Purposes

3/20/78
4/13/78
3/29/78
6/1/78
6/1/78

77-5
77-4
77-2

Revised Outer Continental Shelf Order No.2
Secretarial Order No. 2974
Information Available on WellNo. 3, OCS-G 1029

7/19/77
4/4/77
3/1 /77

76-9
76-6
76-4
76-2

Information Available on Well No.4, OCS-G 2177
Revision of Section 4.D(4), Training, OCS Order No.8
Annual Field Names Master List Revision
Price Determination for Natural Gas Sales Authorized by FPC
Opinion 699-H
Release of High Resolution Geophysical Data Offshore
Louisiana and Texas

11/10/76
10/21/76
9/7 /76

Acceptance of Dipmeter Directional Surveys on Vertical Wells
Release of High Resolution Geophysical Data Offshore Louisiana
and Texas
Guidelines Related to OCS Order No. 11 Provisions on the Flaring
of Casinghead Gas
East Flower Garden Bank Monitoring Requirements
Minimum Geophysical Survey Requirements to Protect Cultural
Resources
Reporting of Fires and Serious Accidents

12/23/75

76-1

75-14
75-13
75-9
75-4
75-3
75-1
74-25
74-23
74-22
74-21
74-19
74-18
74-17
74-16
74-15
74-13
74-12
74-8
74-7
7+6

Addendum to Our Notice No. 74-19
Change in Area of Jurisdiction for New Orleans District Office
Metairie, Louisiana
Change in Area of Jurisdiction for Lafayette District Office
Lafayette District
Establishment of Houma District Office Houma, Louisiana
Relocation of Texas District Office to Freeport, Texas
Establishrnent of Lake Ch3Iles District Office Lake Charles, Louisiana
Subsequent to Biological Survey Requirements
Release of High Resolution Geophysical Data Offshore
Louisiana and Texas
Issuance of Approved Maximum Efficient Rates of Production
for Oil and Gas Reservoirs
Subsequent to NTL No. 74-11 "Hydrogen Sulfide in Drilling Operations"
Biological Survey Requirements
Potential Unstable Sediment Conditions in the Mississippi Delta Area
Analysis Results of Produced Waste Water Discharged into Gulf of
Mexico Waters
Disposal of Produced Sand
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1/'27/76
1/9/76

11/6/75
5/13/75
2/21/75
1/20/7 5
1/2/7 5
12/5/74
11/6/74
11/6/74
11/6/74
10/18/74
10/18/74
8/1 '2/74
10/30/74
8/12/74
5/'29/74
5/15/74
3/29/74
3/25/74
3/25/74

74-5
74-4
74-3
74-1

73-10
73-9
73-8
73-7
73-5
73-4
73-3
73-1
72-12
72-11
72-9
72-8
72-7

72-6
72-5
72-4
72-3
72-2
72-1
71-5
71-4
71-3
71-2
71-1

Reasons for Shut-in Status of Oil and Gas Wells
Amendment to Notice 73-10 Issued December 21, 1973
OCS Order No. II
Applicability of OCS Orders Nos. '2 and 4 to OCS Leases
Issued off the Coasts of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida
Subsurface Safety Device Requirements for Unattended Wells Open
to Production
Hydrogen Sulfide in OCS Operations
Allocation of Royalty Oil
Amendment to Instruction on Run Tickets
Frequency of Sewage EftluentTesting
Special Security Handling of Nell Logs and Data
The Use of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB's)
OCS Order No.5
Disposal of Produced Waste Water Other than into Gulf of ~1exico
Waters
Shut-In Completions
First Safety Alert Notice
Field Names
Designation of "Gulf Coast Region" changed to "Gulf of Mexico
Area," and title "Regional Oil and Gas Supervisor" changed to
"Area Oil and Gas Supervisor"
Approved Ma..'Ximum Production Rate Schedules
Monthly Report of Operations (Form 9-152) and Report on .
Gas Flaring
Casing Design Program
Interim OCS Order No. II
OCS Order NO.5
Approved ~faximum Production Rate

2/7 /74
1/29/74
4/18/74
1/4/74

12/21/73
12/21/73
10/29/73
10/16/73
10/29/73
6/1/73
2/16/73
1/18/73

.-

...1 '1/1
_, ....1 ,17'1

10/13/72
9/22/72
8/30/72

7/12/72
6/29/72
4/21/72
4/7/72
4/5/72
3/28/72
2/22/72

Information Available on Well No.2, OCS-G 1615
Proper Conditioning of Drilling Fluids
OCS Order No. 12
OCS Order No. 8
Transmittal of Working Draft of the Inspection Fonns for
Both Drilling and Producing Operations

12/10/71
9/23/71
8/20/71
7/16/71

70-2
70-1

Interim Oil and Gas Production Rates
Reporting of Oil Slicks

12/7/70
2/5/70

69-2
69-1

OCS Orders No. I through 10
Conditions of Approval to Drill Outer Continental Shelf - Off
Louisiana

9/4/69

Lack of Proper Wellhead Identification

7/11/61

61-1

NOTE: Obtained from:
LA, 1986.

5/27/71

8/28/69

Gulf of Mexico oes Regional Office, Metairie,
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